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Executive Summary
Every year the Canadian Media Concentration Research Project puts out a series of reports on the 
state of the telecoms, Internet, and media industries in Canada. This is the first installment in this 
year’s series (previous versions can be found here).
This report examines the development of the media economy over the past thirty-five years. Since 
beginning this project a decade ago, we have focused on analyzing a comprehensive as possible 
selection of the biggest telecoms, Internet and media industries (based on revenue) in Canada, 
including: mobile wireless and wireline telecoms; Internet access; cable, satellite & IPTV; broadcast 
television, specialty and pay television services as well as Internet-based video subscription and 
download services; radio; newspapers; magazines; music; Internet advertising; social media; 
operating systems; browsers, etc.
Beginning last year, we made some fairly dramatic changes by trying to capture a broader range of 
audiovisual media services that are delivered over the Internet beyond online video subscription and 
download services and Internet advertising. The new sectors brought into our analysis since then 
include: 
1. Online gaming, gaming applications, game downloads or in-game purchases 
(Digital Games);
2. App stores, in particular Google Play and Apple Appstore;
3. Music downloads and streaming music subscriptions.
We classify these sectors as the digital audiovisual media services, or digital AVMS for short, a 
category that also includes online video subscription and download services such as Netflix, Crave, 
Club illico, CBC Gem, Apple iTunes and Amazon Video. We also distinguish them from their legacy 
counterparts (e.g. broadcast TV, specialty and pay TV, radio, music, newspapers, and magazines) that 
do not depend on Internet aggregation and distribution as a core part of their business models and 
activities. 
Figure 1 below depicts the segments of the digital and traditional media industries that collectively 
comprise what we call the network media economy.  
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Figure 1: The Network Media Economy in Canada—What the CMCR Project Covers
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The research method that we use is simple: we begin by examining the individual components of 
the network media economy (i.e. the sectors indicated in Figure 1 above). This involves collecting, 
organizing, and publishing stand-alone data for each media industry individually. We then group 
related, comparable industry sectors into three more general categories: the “telecoms and Internet 
infrastructure media”, the “digital and traditional AVMS” and finally, “core Internet applications and 
sectors”. Ultimately, we combine them all together to get a bird’s-eye view of the network media 
economy, taking care to explain how the sectors interact with one another and fit together to form the 
network media economy as a whole. We call this the scaffolding approach.
Following this approach ensures that we start with a clear, precise definition of “the media” so that 
readers know what is included in our analysis and what is not. It also helps to ensure that apples-
to-apples comparisons are being made with other studies and research reports, both within Canada 
and internationally. Too often, debates in this area proceed without such an explicit definition. As a 
consequence, some researchers cast a conceptual net so wide that the defining details of specific 
media are difficult to discern in their analysis, while others cherry pick sections of the media that 
support the story they want to tell.1
1	 	This	lack	of	conceptual	definition	has	not	stopped	some	researchers,	however,	from	making	brash	claims	about	the	
allegedly	dire	state	of	the	media,	the	impact	of	the	global	Internet	giants	on	domestic	media,	the	catastrophic	scale	of	media	






The scaffolding approach not only allows us to focus on the details and relative scale of the various 
individual segments of the network media economy, but it helps to see how they all fit together, and to 
understand where the many different actors fit within each sector and the network media economy as 
a whole. In concrete terms, this allows us to see how major domestic actors stack up when measured 
against the activities of major global players within the Canadian context. Lastly, this approach 
reveals which of these industries are growing, which are stagnating, which are in decline, and which 
appear to be recovering after years of misery. Table 1, below, offers a high-level snapshot of where 
things stood at the end of 2019.
Table 1: The Growth, Stagnation and Decline of Media within the Network Media 
Economy, 2019 
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Beyond the overall direction of developments within specific sectors over the past year, the report 
identifies several major ongoing developments in Canada’s network media economy:
•	 The overall story is one of ongoing growth, upheaval and increased complexity for the network 
media economy rather than a Cassandra story of widespread crisis. 
•	 Despite a continued focus on advertising revenue in much communication and media 
scholarship, public debates and policy circles, the reality is that revenue from subscriber fees 
and direct purchases are at the centre of the media economy. Indeed, revenue from subscriber 
fees and direct purchases outstrip advertising revenue by a nearly 5 to 1 ratio. It is also 
critically important to note that the total scope of advertising spend for all media has been 
relatively fixed over time, and actually fell or stagnated for much of the last decade in inflation 
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adjusted terms, on a per capita basis and relative to the size of the overall economy. At the 
same time, advertising revenue continues to shift to Internet behemoths such as Google and 
Facebook. This means that those sectors of the media and firms dependent on advertising are 
battling some of the world’s largest Internet companies to retain a share of relatively stagnant 
pool of advertising dollars. 
•	 Contrary to narratives overly focused on broadcast television, Canada’s audiovisual media 
services market continues to grow swiftly, bolstered by a raft of online video services. The 
story is even stronger for investment in Canada’s film and television production sector, which 
has nearly doubled in the past decade.
•	 Rather than looking to historical approaches to broadcasting regulation, governments should 
heed experiences in telecom and banking regulation to inform their policy responses to the 
network media challenges of today. These approaches take seriously the need for structural 
and behavioural regulation of platforms, and potentially extending fiduciary duties to the inputs 
of the digital economy. 
Ultimately, our goal is also to bring a wealth of historically- and theoretically-informed empirical 
evidence to bear on contentious claims about the media industries. Within a context where the role 
of policy and regulators looms large, knowing both the details and the broad sweep of the network 
media economy allows us to make informed contributions to the debate from an independent 
standpoint. This is especially necessary given the ongoing Parliamentary responses to recently 
concluded reviews of, for example, the Telecommunications Act, Broadcasting Act, Copyright 
Modernization Act and Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). In 
light of such realities we need the best, most independent view of the landscape that we can get, and 
that is what we strive to do with our annual reviews and regular updates to our public data sets. 
This informed and independent view is also a key input to what could be considered the preeminent 
debate in this area of policy, the role of digital giants in the future of Canadian and global media 
markets. Indeed, in the last four to five years alone, there have been at least eighty public policy 
examinations of the digital platforms worldwide, as governments from India and Australia to the 
Netherlands, the United States and Canada all grapple with the potentially far-reaching implications 
of these new actors and their impacts on journalism, the media, economy and society (Winseck & 
Puppis, 2020). 
Fundamental questions about whether the very business models and extraordinary market power 
of Internet giants such as Facebook and Google are inherently primed for nefarious possibilities2, 
regardless of their owners’ best intentions to connect the world and foster community, are now on the 
table like never before.
2  See: The revelations in early 2018 that Cambridge Analytical harvested personal information from 87 million 
Facebook users’ profiles—including 620,000 in Canada—and that such information was then used as part of questionable 
electoral campaign strategies and disinformation campaigns—i.e. the 2016 US presidential election, the Brexit referendum 
in the United Kingdom, elections in the Netherlands, Germany, Brazil and other countries around the world.
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Questions are also being raised about whether these entities have become too big to effectively 
govern—either through self-regulation or by existing democratic institutions3. As a general principle, 
unless the rules shaping such companies’ conduct are guided by duly constituted legal and 
democratic oversight by parliaments, the courts, or administrative agencies—as was the case for 
the recent changes to the Canada Elections Act—demands for the digital platforms to better govern 
themselves will likely make their “black box” character even more opaque than they already are. That 
Amazon, Facebook or Google could be broken up just like AT&T was in 1984 is no longer a far-fetched 
idea (Khan, 2017; Vaidhyanathan, 2018; United States Judiciary Committee, 2020; Wu, 2018). Indeed, 
the issue is no longer if the platforms and Internet content will be regulated but when and how they 
will.4 
We are fully supportive of concerns regarding the scale of these companies, their clout, and the 
threats that they pose to the Internet, some media, democracy and society. We are also fully 
supportive of the idea that a whole new generation of Internet regulation may be needed to regulate 
them for precisely these reasons. 
However, our analysis also suggests that claims that the Internet hypergiants’ fortunes are being 
made by cannibalizing the revenue that journalism and the music, movie, television and publishing 
industries need to survive should be met with a healthy dose of skepticism. There is also a need 
to be vigilant that the push for a new generation of Internet regulation does not just translate into 
harnessing the Internet-centric communications and media arrangements of today to protecting 
approaches to broadcasting regulation and cultural policy of the past. There is also ample reason for 
concern that the tough structural and behavioural regulatory remedies that are needed to counteract 
problems of consolidation at every level of the communications, Internet and media ecosystem, and 
the unlimited personal data harvesting models—that fuel the commercial Internet services but which 
are proving to be so corrosive of people’s trust, social relationships and democracy—are thoroughly 
addressed, rather than the pronounced tendency at present to skip those steps in favour of directly 
regulating Internet content in a misdirect gambit to solve all of society’s perceived ills by cleaning up 
the Internet and so-called “harmful content” online.5
To help understand this tangled knot of issues we need to better appraise where the Internet giants 
currently stand within Canada. And in so doing, our first question needs to be, of course, we know that 
















Our data show that the US-based Internet giants are consolidating their dominance of digital 
advertising markets in Canada and becoming increasingly dominant across the advertising landscape 
as a whole. Indeed, the shift to the “mobile Internet” has helped Google and Facebook, in particular, 
to consolidate their lock on both online advertising and, increasingly, advertising spending across 
all media, as we will show later in this report. In addition, as the global Internet giants increasingly 
aggregate and distribute media and cultural content, existing media groups are becoming more 
platform-dependent, potentially jeopardizing their own economic, technological and cultural 
autonomy for uncertain benefits (Nieborg & Poell, 2018; Myllylahti, 2019). All of this is critical to 
comprehending the bleak place in which many advertising-based media now stand.
However, while the growing clout of Internet hypergiants such as Google and Facebook is 
unmistakeable, it is a mistake to generalize from the digital duopoly’s dominance of the Internet 
advertising market in Canada to the $91.3 billion network media economy writ large. The same 
applies globally. Indeed, treating developments in the advertising-based sectors as representative 
of the overall direction of the industry obscures the reality that these sectors constitute a small and 
receding proportion of the network media economy as a whole. Moreover, while the influence of the 
big five digital platforms—i.e. Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft, aka GAFAM—and 
Netflix is significant, within countries (Canada in particular) they continue to be outstripped by a large 
margin by the biggest national telecommunications and media groups, as this and the next report in 
this series will show.
Ultimately, the media’s place in the economy, society and our everyday lives is changing dramatically 
and is currently up for grabs in ways seldom seen. Some communication historians call times like 
these a “critical juncture” (McChesney), or a “constitutive moment” (Starr), when decisions made will 
become embedded in technology, markets and institutions, and then press down on us, for perhaps 
a century or more if the lessons of “the industrial media age” offer any guide to the contemporary 
debates surrounding the “Internet” or “digital media age”. The CMCR Project does its best to engage 
with such realities in a bid to help secure the communication and media that we need and deserve.
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Summary of key findings and 
insights
•	 The network media economy has more than quadrupled in size, from $19.4 billion in 1984 to 
$91.3 billion last year, and continues to grow at a quick pace overall.
•	 Mobile wireless and Internet access services continued to grow briskly, as revenues rose 
to $29.2 billion and $12.7 billion, respectively; while revenue for cable, IPTV and satellite TV 
continued to slide to $8.3 billion in 2019. The communication networks that connect people to 
one another, to the Internet, other media and other services across the economy and society—
i.e. mobile wireless, Internet access, cable, satellite and IPTV services—accounted for 70% of 
total revenue for the network media economy last year ($63.5 billion), while the media content 
sectors take up the rest ($27.6 billion). In short, bandwidth, not content, is king in the network 
media economy.
•	 Revenue for digital audiovisual media services (AVMS)—online video, music, gaming and app 
stores—soared to over $5.6 billion last year. Add Internet advertising ($8.8 billion), and the 
digital AVMS sectors constituted a $14.4 billion pillar of the network media economy in 2019, 
or 16% of all revenue. 
•	 As a result of these developments, global actors like Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, 
Microsoft and Netflix (the so-called GAFAM+ group of Internet giants) become central figures 
on the media landscape in Canada. Combined, they had $9.2 billion in revenue last year. 
•	 While communication and media companies in Canada face intensifying competition in digital 
AVMS as a result, the “big 5” companies in Canada still account for nearly three-quarters 
of all revenue across the network media economy: Bell, Rogers, Telus, Shaw (Corus) and 
Quebecor. In contrast, the GAFAM+ group’s combined market share is 10%. As this report also 
emphasizes, the Canadian situation is unique insofar that all the major commercial TV services 
are owned by telecommunications firms whose operations span many aspects of the network 
media economy that go far beyond television and internet advertising.
•	 Although broadcast television is in dire straits, the TV marketplace is thriving due to the 
addition of new pay TV sectors over time, including over-the-Internet video services. Total 
TV revenues soared to $8.8 billion in 2019. Netflix had year-over year average of 6.4 million 
subscribers and $1.1 billion in revenue in Canada last year. At year’s end, 46% of households 
subscribed to Netflix (the CRTC reports far larger figures but we are skeptical of its estimates 
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for reasons explained in this report). Record high levels of investment in television and film 
production continued last year, with total investments of $9.3 billion. 
•	 As a result of downward pressure on total advertising revenue over the past decade and the 
rise of Internet giants such as Google and Facebook, media sectors that depend primarily on 
advertising are in crisis, e.g. broadcast TV, radio, newspapers and magazines. Collectively, 
these sectors have lost $4.9 billion, eight broadcast television stations have gone dark and 
numerous daily newspapers have been closed or pared back their publishing schedules since 
2008. 
•	 Newspapers are in turmoil with revenue plunging from a high of $4.7 billion in 2008 to 
$2.2 billion last year. After rising steadily between 1987 until 2013, the number of full-time 
journalists has dropped by 30% in the last 6 years. As the number of journalists shrinks, 
the void is being filled by a vast expansion in the ranks of public relations, advertising and 
marketing professionals.
1
The Network Media Economy in 
Canada: Contemporary Trends 
and Ongoing Policy Debates
For nearly a decade, the CMCR Project has put out an annual series of reports on the state of the 
telecoms, Internet and media industries in Canada. This report is the first installment in this year’s 
series. It examines the development of the media economy since 1984, with the “media” defined 
broadly to include data for nineteen different sectors grouped into three categories, as depicted in 
Figure 1 below:
Figure 1: Key Sectors of the Network Media Economy in Canada, 2019
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Ultimately, we combine all of these separate sectors together to get a bird’s-eye view of the network 
media economy. 
The aim of this approach—and this report—is to get the best sense we can of how all the different 
sectors of the telecoms-Internet and media industries have developed over time, to understand the 
scale and pace of the changes that are taking place, and to see how all of the sectors that we cover 
fit together to form “the network media economy”. To this end, our approach begins by assembling a 
multisectoral body of data for the telecoms and Internet access, audio-visual media services and core 
Internet applications listed in Figure 1 above that collectively comprise “the network media economy”. 
The objective is also to determine which of these media sectors are growing, stagnating or in decline, 
while also highlighting those that have found renewed paths to growth, such as the music industry. 
To this end, the report pays close attention to, for instance, whether online audiovisual media services 
such as Netflix, Crave and Spotify, and online gaming, apps and app stores (digital games), are 
cannibalizing established media or helping to expand the size and diversity of the media economy. 
Other trends such as cord-cutting and cord-shaving are also examined.
Over the past three-and-a-half decades, the rise of entirely new media sectors–e.g. mobile wireless, 
Internet access, pay and specialty TV, digital AVMS, and so forth—has added immensely to the size 
and complexity of the media economy. As a result, between 1984 and last year, total revenue for 
the network media economy in Canada more than quadrupled from $19.4 billion to $91.3 billion. 
In contrast to those who claim that the media economy in this country is a pygmy amongst giants, 
especially relative to the United States, it is important to highlight the fact that of the thirty countries 
examined in Who Owns the World’s Media, the sum total of which account for roughly 90% of the 
world’s media revenues, Canada ranked as having the 9th largest media economy (Noam, 2016, pp. 
1018-19).
Figure 2 below illustrates the immense growth and transformations of the network media economy in 
Canada that has taken place over the past thirty-five years. 
Between 1984 and last year, total revenue for 
the network media economy in Canada more 
than quadrupled from $19.4 billion to $91.3 
billion. 
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Figure 2: Development of Telecom & Internet Access Services vs Digital and 
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Source: see the “Media Economy” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
While all segments of the telecoms-Internet and media industries have grown substantially over the 
long-run, there are several trends and unique differences among them that merit closer attention. A 
key development identified in this report, for instance, is the extent to which advertising-funded media 
(i.e. broadcast television, radio, newspapers and magazines) have been steadily eclipsed by the 









By 2019, the telecoms and Internet access segments—i.e. the pipes, bandwidth, and spectrum-based 
connections that are now central to effective participation in society, the economy and daily life—
had total combined revenues of $63.6 billion, or 70% of all revenue generated within the network 
media economy, compared to the $15.6 billion generated by the advertising-funded media content 
industries. These sectors have grown far more quickly than others and are vastly larger than the 
content side of the media.
Adding to the shift away from ad-supported media, the combined revenue for online video, music, 
digital games and app stores has soared from $720 million in 2011 to $5.6 billion last year. In fact, 
combined revenue for telecoms and internet access services as well as subscription-based digital 
AVMS services now outstrip that of advertising-funded media, including Internet advertising, by a 
nearly five-to-one ratio. The upshot of these developments is that, in an increasingly Internet- and 
mobile wireless-centric world, it is network connectivity and subscriber fees, not advertising-
supported media, that are king (see Odlyzko).7
While there is no doubt that advertising is and will continue to be an important part of the media 
economy, it only underpins a relatively small and steadily receding subset of the media. Altogether, 
advertising-funded media account for a modest 17% ($15.6 billion) of the $91.3 billion media 
economy. Moreover, as we will see, for those media that depend primarily on advertising revenue, a 
decade of intermittently slow, stagnating and slumping growth after the financial crisis of 2008 has 
had devastating effects. As a result of this “lost decade”, revenue for broadcast television, radio and 
magazines, for example, fell by a third, while newspaper revenue collapsed to levels less than half of 
what they were a little over a decade ago. That all of this took place at the moment when the global 
Internet giants such as Google and Facebook were coming into their own obviously dealt those media 
that rely mainly on advertising revenue a serious blow. 
7	 	See	the	“Media	Economy”	sheet	in	the Excel Workbook.
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Figure 3 below goes a step further by separately depicting each sector covered in this report and 
its evolution over time. While all areas of the telecoms-Internet and media industries have grown 
substantially over the long-run, and changes have been especially fast moving with respect to the 
digital AVMS sectors in the last five or six years, there are also unique differences among all of them 
that merit closer attention.
Figure 3: Separate Media, Distinct Evolutionary Paths and the Network Media 
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Source: see the “Media Economy” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
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To be sure, communication and media companies in Canada are facing intensifying competition 
with Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft (the so-called GAFAM group of Internet giants) 
as well as Netflix over this bigger pie as the latter move more deeply into various aspects of the 
media landscape in Canada than ever before. As they take on a growing role in the aggregation and 
distribution of media content, for instance, existing media groups are becoming more platform-
dependent, at the risk of jeopardizing their own economic and cultural autonomy—and for uncertain 
benefits (see van Dijck, Nieborg & Poell, 2019; Myllylahti, 2019). 
These developments have ignited fierce debates over the impact of GAFAM on the media in Canada—
as well as other countries around the world—and are a key driver of calls for aggressive new forms of 
digital platform regulation that would have been unfathomable just a few years ago. They have also 
re-ignited long dormant debates over cultural nationalism and technological sovereignty that have not 
been seen with such intensity since the 1970s and 1980s. 
These concerns have been coming to head in the last few years as scholars and policymakers 
around the world intensely scrutinize a litany of problematic practices arising from the growth 
of the tech giants. These include: the rise of platform power and “digital dominance”; potential 
threats to domestic media and cultures; privacy and data protection; “fake news” and hate speech; 
national sovereignty; the integrity of elections; and antitrust. Consequently, governments from 
India and Australia to the Netherlands and Canada are all grappling with the implications of these 
developments. Indeed, there have been at least eighty such public policy examinations in the last five 
years alone, as one ongoing tally of these inquiries chronicles (Winseck & Puppis, 2019). 
These developments have ignited fierce debates over 
the impact of GAFAM on the media in Canada—as 
well as other countries around the world—and are a 
key driver of calls for aggressive new forms of digital 
platform regulation that would have been unfathomable 
just a few years ago. 
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The Telecoms and Internet 
Infrastructure Sectors: Bandwidth 
is King, Not Content
Anchor Findings
 } Mobile wireless and Internet access services continue to grow at a 
brisk pace, but Canada’s struggle to meet its targets for universal, 
affordable broadband internet access continues to be a significant 
issue.
 } Canada’s adoption of IPTV is high relative to other countries, but it 
severely lags international peers in “fibre to the premises” access, 
the gold standard for communications infrastructure.
 } Following favourable regulatory outcomes related to minimum 
service standard and net neutrality in the mid-2010s, a change in 
CRTC leadership has put the future of broadband regulation into 
question.
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The telecoms and Internet access industries have grown enormously, from $13.1 billion in 1984 to 
$63.6 billion last year. They account for approximately 70% of all revenue, and are thus the fulcrum 
upon which the media economy pivots. Figure 4 illustrates their development over time.
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Wireless Wireline Internet Access Cable + DTH IPTV Total $
 
Source: see the “Wireline”, “Wireless”, “ISPs” and “CableSatIPTV” sheets in the Excel Workbook.
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Mobile wireless services have expanded quickly 
since the turn-of-the-21st century to become a 
cornerstone of the digital media ecology. They 
overtook plain old wireline telephone services in 
2009 based on revenue, while in 2014 the number 
of Canadian households subscribing exclusively 
to mobile services for their voice calling needs 
exceeded those relying exclusively on landlines 
for the first time (CRTC, 2015, p. 1). The centrality 
of mobile wireless services is also underscored 
by the fact that they are now the largest sector of 
the network media economy, by far, with revenue 
having grown nearly six-fold from $5.4 billion in 
2000 to an estimated $29.2 billion last year. 
The sustained growth of mobile wireless services 
has tracked an expanding array of devices 
that people use to connect to mobile wireless 
networks—a sector that once primarily connected 
“feature phones” and pagers now provides 
connectivity to a constantly expanding range of 
different smartphones, tablets, and connected 
laptop PCs. As providers begin to debut “5G” 
networks, it is expected that this array will 
continue to expand in both scale and scope, with 
the emphasis shifting even further in the direction 
of data-based broadband services, rather than the 
traditional voice-based services that gave mobile 
services their start. Consistent with this trend, 
mobile data traffic doubled in Canada between 
2012 and 2013, and has continued to grow in the 
40-60% range every year since. Cisco projects 
that mobile data traffic will grow four-fold 
between 2017 and 2022.
Despite this fast growth, mobile broadband 
(i.e. the mobile internet) adoption and usage in 
Canada continues to rank poorly against other 
OECD countries. Indeed, Canada ranks a lowly 
32nd out of 37 OECD countries for broadband 
wireless penetration as of December 2019—a 
further drop in rank by one place of where it was 
last year and at levels well below those in the US, 
UK, Denmark, Australia, and the vast majority of 
other OECD countries. Figure 5, below, illustrates 
the point. Moreover, this is a position that 
Canada has languished in for a decade-and-a-
half (Benkler, Faris, Glasser, Miyakawa, Schultze, 
2010; OECD, 2011).
Mobile Wireless
Canada ranks a lowly 32nd out of 37 OECD countries 
for broadband wireless penetration as of December 
2019—a further drop in rank by one place of where it 
was last year and at levels well below those in the US, 
UK, Denmark, Australia, and the vast majority of other 
OECD countries.
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Canada
Source: OECD Broadband Portal.
Like other sectors, revenue growth in mobile 
wireless slowed post-2008. Already as early as 
2013, some observers argued that this was the 
result of a maturing market (Church and Wilkins, 
2013, p. 40), but this explanation is myopic and 
ignores the under-development of the mobile 
wireless market in Canada relative to all but a 
few of its OECD peers. In addition, the intervening 
years have shown this prediction to be incorrect. 
Although revenue continues to grow at a 
significant rate, adoption levels in Canada have 
not improved substantially, either in absolute 
terms or relative to our peers.
For households in the lowest income quintile, 
more than one-in-four do not subscribe to a 
mobile wireless service, while just a little over 
one-in-seven of those on the next rung up the 
income ladder stand in the same position. At 
the opposite end of the income scale, however, 
mobile wireless penetration is nearly universal 
at 97%. Figure 6 illustrates the levels of adoption 
for mobile phones by income quintiles in Canada 
as of 2017 (which is, unfortunately, still the most 
recent data from Statistics Canada), as well as 
for broadband Internet, home computers and 
cable television.
11
























 Cellular Phones BDU (Cable, DTH, IPTV)
Source: Statistics Canada (2019). Dwelling characteristics, by household income quintile in Canada. In 
Statistics Canada, 2018. Survey of Household Spending.
In the past, Rogers, Bell, Telus, and other 
observers who are content to serve “economic” 
customers (while ignoring those who struggle 
to afford access to this crucial service) have 
attempted to distract attention from these 
low levels of penetration by touting the 
supposedly large number of subscribers who 
have smartphones. However, as the OECD data 
presented above show, adoption of mobile 
broadband services in Canada—smartphone 
connectivity, that is—remains woefully low by 
international standards (OECD, 2019).
Canada does not fare well in terms of mobile 
data usage either, ranking 31st out of 35 OECD 
countries for which data was available last year. 
With an average of 2.9 GB of mobile data usage 
per subscriber per month last year, Canada 
was well below the OECD average of 5.8 GB per 
month, and dramatically behind usage levels in 
countries such as Finland (23.5 GB, the leader), 
Austria (19.1 GB),  Denmark (9.6 GB) Sweden (8.9 
GB) and considerably less than in France (7.7 
GB), as well as the UK (4.1 GB) and Australia (7.6 
GB) (OECD, 2019). 
There are many reasons for this state of affairs, 
but price and affordability are certainly two key 
considerations (OECD, 2018; Klass & Winseck, 
2019). The concentrated structure of mobile 
wireless markets and diagonally-integrated 
nature of the firms that operate in them are also 
key factors. Incoherent policies and inconsistent 
actions by the CRTC, Competition Bureau 
and ISED/Industry Canada also contribute 
greatly to this state of affairs (see Middleton, 
2017 and Benkler, et. al. 2009). At present, the 
CRTC is undertaking a review of its policies 
directed toward the mobile wireless sector, with 
a specific focus on determining whether current 
levels of competition are sufficient to serve the 
interests of users. The above adoption and usage 
data suggest that they are not; we, along with 
many others in Canada, anxiously await the result 
of this consultation. 
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From Plain Old Telephone Service to Broadband 
Internet Access and Internet Protocol TV 
While wireless services now occupy the centre of the media universe, the wireline telecoms 
infrastructure that supports plain old telephone service (POTS), value-added business services, 
internet access, cable and IPTV networks continues in its place as a pillar in the network media 
economy. Combined, these services accounted for over half of all telecoms and internet access 
revenues (50.6%) in 2018, while mobile wireless services accounted for the rest.
On its own, however, plain old telephone service revenue fell to $13.4 billion last year—far off the 
high-water mark of $21.2 billion in 2000, but with the steep drop-off flattening out in recent years. 
Those decreases, however, have been offset by gains in internet access, IPTV and cable revenues. 
Most of the telecoms and cable companies such as Bell, Telus, Rogers, Shaw, Quebecor and Cogeco 
were also acquiring data centre operations in the early part of this decade but in the past few years, 
the latter three have reversed course and sold off their data centres to firms specializing in cloud 
computing. More recently, some firms have moved into the provision of specialized services; for 
instance Telus has begun to offer healthcare-related services accounted for within the ambit of its 
wireline division. The lack of available disaggregated data does not allow us to gauge the scale of 
these activities with any precision, but it is worth noting that they may be coming to play an increasing 
role in the wireline activities of major Canadian telecommunication companies.
Internet access revenues have grown immensely in the past decade, similar to mobile wireless. 
Internet access revenues were roughly $12.7 billion last year, up from $11.8 billion the previous year, 
and more than six times what they were at the turn-of-the-21st century ($1.8 billion). The adoption of 
wireline Internet access in Canada is high relative to other OECD countries, but so too are prices, while 
available speeds are mediocre, household data use comparatively low (192 GB per household per 
month in 2018), and data caps commonplace, whereas in most comparable countries they are rare 
and overage charges not nearly as punishingly expensive (OECD, 2018; FCC, 2017; ITU, 2018; Cisco, 
2017). 
Internet access revenues were roughly $12.7 
billion last year, up from $11.8 billion the 
previous year, and more than six times what 
they were at the turn-of-the-21st century 
($1.8 billion).
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Also, like mobile wireless services, high-speed and broadband Internet access are far from universal. 
According to Statistics Canada’s most recent data (2017), 86% of households have adopted high-
speed internet access service (i.e. > 1.5 Mbps). If we consider the uptake of services that meet 
the broadband universal service target of 50 Mbps up and 10 Mbps down adopted by the CRTC in 
2016, half of Canadian households met that target in 2018 (CRTC, CMR 2019, p. 255). There are also 
significant disparities in access between urban versus rural and remote areas, and people’s adoption 
of broadband is divided starkly along income lines as well. Figure 7 below illustrates the point.























Source: Statistics Canada (2019). Dwelling characteristics, by household income quintile in Canada. In 
Statistics Canada, 2019. Survey of Household Spending.
A key development over the past decade-and-a-half has been the growth of the telephone companies’ 
(e.g. Telus, Bell, SaskTel) Internet Protocol TV (IPTV) services. This took place slowly at first but since 
2010 the pace of IPTV development has quickened. By the end of last year, the incumbent telcos’ 
managed Internet-based television services had over 3 million subscribers between them. As a result, 
the telco’s IPTV services now compete extensively with traditional cable television services in cities 
across the country. Figure 8 below shows the growth in IPTV subscribers over the past decade-and-a-
half.
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Bell Fibe TV Telus Bell Aliant MTS Allstream SaskTel
Source: see the “IPTV” data sheet in the Excel Workbook.
The telcos’ revenue from IPTV service has also increased sharply from $1 billion in 2013 to nearly 
$2.1 billion last year–again, nearly double the amount six years earlier. Figure 9 below shows the 
trends. 
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Bell Fibe TV Telus Bell Aliant MTS Allstream (4) SaskTel
Source: see the “IPTV” data sheet in the Excel Workbook.
15
The addition of IPTV as a new television 
distribution platform has brought the telecoms 
operators deeper into the cable companies’ 
traditional turf. MTS, SaskTel and Telus first 
began to deploy IPTV in the prairie and western 
provinces in the mid-2000s, with Bell only 
following suit in the early 2010s, perhaps 
because it did not want to cannibalize its direct-
to-home satellite television service. Fast forward 
to 2019, and the number of IPTV subscribers and 
revenue have grown considerably, accounting 
for over a quarter of the TV distribution market. 
Moreover, the fact that telecoms operators’ IPTV 
services have gained market share at the same 
time that “cord cutting” has picked up steam in 
the past five years has significantly added to the 
competitive pressure that the cable companies 
now face from the telcos’ IPTV services. 
Figure 10 below illustrates these points. 
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Cable + DTH IPTV
Sources: see the “IPTV” and “CableSatIPTV” data sheets in the Excel Workbook.
As Figure 10 also shows, cord cutting—the 
process whereby people drop their cable, 
IPTV or DTH service in favour of accessing 
audiovisual media services directly over the 
Internet (or over the ai, or not at all)—has gained 
traction over the past five years. Thus, even 
though IPTV has grown substantially over the 
past decade, the number of subscribers for all 
broadcast distribution undertakings (BDUs as 
they are called in Canadian regulatory parlance) 
has slipped from 85.6% of households at its 
highpoint in 2011 to 75% last year. In short, the 
phenomenon of cord-cutting is real. 
The loss in BDU subscribers that has taken place, 
however, has resulted only in modest revenue 
losses to the BDU sector; revenue fell from $8.9 
billion in 2014 to $8.2 billion last year—a decline 
of 7%. This is largely because at the same time 
that cable subscribers were starting to cut 
the cord there have been steep increases in 
subscription prices for BDU services. Crucially, 
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just as people have turned to access online subscription-based and download AVMS directly in lieu of 
a cable subscription, the price of Internet access has also jumped. In fact, the price of subscriptions 
for cable TV and Internet access have risen well above increases in the consumer price index, as 
Figure 11 below illustrates. The sharp rise in Internet access prices since 2010-2011, just as cord 
cutting was starting to cut into the cable operators’ revenues, is especially noteworthy.8
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IPTV services are also critically important 
because they are the cornerstone of the telecoms 
operators’ efforts to bring next generation, fiber-
based Internet networks closer to subscribers, 
mostly to neighbourhood nodes and increasingly 
to people’s doorsteps. In fact, the distribution of 
television and entertainment services are critical 
to driving the demand, and thus the revenue, that 
the telecoms operators need to invest in bringing 
next generation fibre optic broadband networks 
to people’s doorsteps (see below).
The rate of IPTV adoption in Canada has been 
relatively high by international standards. 
Just over 20% of households in Canada 
subscribed to IPTV services in 2019. While 
comparable international data for 2019 is not 
publicly available, this level of IPTV adoption 
is comparable to adoption levels for 2016 in 
Spain (where uptake of IPTV reached 20% of 
households), China (where it was 21%) and 
Sweden (17%) but well above the US (9%), Japan 
(8%), Germany (6%), the UK (7%) and Australia 
(7%). However, IPTV uptake in Canada still lags 
far behind where adoption levels were as of 2016 
in France (40%), Korea (32%) and the Netherlands 
(30%) (Ofcom, 2017 p. 106).
While Canada has done fairly well with respect 
to IPTV availability and adoption, the picture 
changes for fiber-to-the-premise/doorstep 
(FTTP), which, as Susan Crawford (2019) 
observes, represents the gold standard of 
telecommunications networks, and will be a 
requirement for future economic growth. Indeed, 
just 17.2% of broadband connections in Canada 
use FTTP compared to the OECD average of 
28%. At the high end of the scale, in Norway, 
Finland, Sweden, Japan and Korea, one-half to 
four-fifths of all broadband connections are fiber-
based. According to the OECD, Canada ranked 
26th out of 36 countries on this measure as of 
December 2019. Figure 12 below illustrates the 
point. 
The rate of IPTV adoption in Canada has been 
relatively high by international standards. Just 
over 20% of households in Canada subscribed to 
IPTV services in 2019. 
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Source: OECD (2020). Broadband Portal, Table 1.10.
In sum, when it comes to fibre-optic networks, the prairie telcos and Telus were the first do deply 
them in the mid-2000s while Bell only began to do so in a substantial way after 2010. Globally, Bell’s 
late turn to IPTV and FTTP in Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Provinces means that Canada continues to 
lag significantly behind comparable countries on this measure.
The distribution of television and entertainment 
services are critical to driving the demand, and 
thus the revenue, that the telecoms operators 
need to invest in bringing next generation fibre 
optic broadband networks to people’s doorsteps. 
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Broadband Policy, Politics and Public 
Interests: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?
The general evolutionary pattern that we 
see replays a long-standing practice for new 
services to start out as luxuries for the rich 
before a combination of competitive markets, 
public pressures and public policies turn 
them into affordable necessities for people 
at large (see Richard John with respect to 
the US history, Robert Babe for Canada). 
Current debates over access to broadband 
infrastructure are the latest iteration of this old 
story (Winseck Reconvergence, Winseck and 
Pike, John, Babe, Middleton). In fact, this could 
be seen at the end of 2016, when the CRTC 
set new standards for universal and affordable 
broadband Internet service: minimum speeds 
of 50 Mbps up and 10 Mbps down to 90% of the 
population by 2021 (and the rest of the country 
a decade to a decade-and-a-half later), and with 
an unlimited option on offer—that is, an Internet 
connection with no data cap. While the idea 
of unlimited Internet service was the norm in 
Canada before 2010, and remains so for most 
people in the developed world, today it is just one 
available options amongst others and  expensive 
in Canada. Policymakers have recognized that 
access to the Internet is no longer a luxury, and 
this has been made especially clear during the 
Covid-19 pandemic of 2020, large strides will 
be needed to ensure that aspirations meet the 
reality on the ground, as Canada’s standing with 
respect to deployment and adoption of fibre-to-
the-doorstep reminds us.
A similar relatively large view of the public’s 
interests was pursued in early 2017 under 
the previous CRTC chair when the regulator 
adopted new rules that stop the telcos and ISPs 
from using zero-rating to pick and choose some 
services, apps and content that won’t count 
against subscribers’ monthly mobile wireless 
data caps while everything else does. While 
zero-rating can be attractive to the companies as 
a way to differentiate their services from those 
of competitors, and to some consumers who 
see this as way of getting data for “free”, such 
practices are better seen as marketing gimmicks 
propped up by artificially low data gaps and 
limited choices. In places where data caps are 
large or non-existent, zero-rating is rarely used, 
whereas in countries where they are low, like 
Canada, it is far more common—at least until the 
CRTC’s ruling that effectively banned it.
While mobile wireless markets tend to be highly 
concentrated wherever one looks around the 
world, it is the absence of stand-alone mobile 
network operators and maverick firms—a case 
that fits Canada—where data caps tend to be 
the lowest and the most extensively used. This 
phenomenon is further aggravated in contexts 
where telephone companies also own TV and 
entertainment services, as is in Canada, because 
under circumstances where vertical integration 
is the norm, carriers have both the incentive and 
the ability to zero-rate their own services while 
counting everything else towards subscribers’ 
monthly data allowance. In other words, several 
structural features of broadband and mobile 
wireless markets in Canada bias them toward 
low and restrictive data caps and pressure from 
service providers to adopt “zero-rating” as an 
alternative to giving subscribers bigger data 
allowances, or even making unlimited services 
the norm rather than an expensive and rare 
option (see, for example, Rewheel/Digital Fuel 
Monitor, 2018).
Ultimately, questions about zero-rating embody a 
philosophy of communication, one that says that 
when data caps are high or non-existent, people 
can use bandwidth to communicate, entertain, 
express themselves, work and do with as they 
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want— within the limits of the law, of course. 
When they are low, however, what people can and 
cannot do with “the means of communication” 
at their disposal is restricted. Seen from this 
angle, the issues at stake are not just about 
prices but whether the speech and editorial rights 
of people, “content creators and distributors”, 
apps makers and service providers come first 
or whether those of the telephone companies 
and ISPs are paramount. In early 2017, the CRTC 
ruled in favour of the first group, and drew on the 
principles and history of common carriage9 to do 
so (see Klass, Winseck, Nanni & McKelvey, 2016).
Both rulings—the new basic service standard 
and the zero-rating decisions—staked out a 
fairly ambitious view of what Canadians need 
and deserve in “the digital media age”. On the 
one hand, it includes affordable access to high 
quality communication services and gives 
priority to the speech and expressive rights 
of people, content creators, apps developers 
and service providers over the those who own 
broadband Internet access and mobile wireless 
networks. Consequently, people do not have to 
accept only what the market gives them because 
communication needs have been recast in a 
more expansive way in the light of conditions in 
the 21st Century.
On the other hand, the telephone companies 
do not like this run-of- events and have wasted 
no effort fighting to change it over the course 
of the last year. Thus far, however, their main 
success appears to have been only to slow down 
the pace of change. The ongoing reviews of 
the Telecommunications Act and Broadcasting 
Act, and the swapping out of the public interest 
friendly J.P. Blais for an industry insider in 
September 2017, however, are fraught with risk 
and there is already some evidence of back-
peddling by the Commission.
When the new Chair of the Commission, Ian 
Scott, was given the reins of the CRTC he was 
met with skepticism but also a willingness 
amongst critics, reformers and public interest 
9	 	In	contemporary	parlance,	the	concept	of	“net	neutrality”	often	serves	as	shorthand	for	core	principles	of	common	
carriage.
advocates to suspend judgement because in the 
recent past their early suspicions of appointees 
who seemed too close to industry—i.e. Tom 
Wheeler’s position at the helm of the FCC in the 
US in 2013—or too close to the government—i.e. 
Daniel Therrien, a former national security 
specialist in the Harper Government, as the 
head of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
a year later—ended up pursuing courses of 
actions that confounded early expectations, and 
with impressive results. That well of goodwill, 
however, is beginning to run dry in light of, for 
example: 
 } the new Chair’s seeming deference to 
industry insiders, 
 } the call to “harness” the internet to a 
model of cultural policy created over a 
half-century ago and maintained since, 
reinforced by a call from the Chair for an 
ISP levy in support of Canadian content 
(CRTC, 2018),
 } the constrained basis for the Commission’s 
rejection of an industry proposed website 
blocking scheme designed to combat 
piracy (CRTC, 2018, TD 2018-384), 
 } and a seeming reluctance by the Chair to 
gird the CRTC’s collective spine to face 
the realities of persistently high levels 
of concentration and sky-high levels of 
vertical integration in key communications 
and media sectors that have that have not 
served citizens, consumers, creators or the 
public sphere well.  
It may still be too early to render a final judgment 
on the current approach to policy and regulation 
at the CRTC. However, numerous warning signs 
have been sounded that should not be ignored.
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Traditional and Digital 
Audiovisual Media Services 
(AVMS): From Ad-Supported 
Content Media to Fast Growing 
Subscription-based Digital Media
The remainder of this report shifts gears to examine ongoing developments in the media content 
sectors—also referred to as the AVMS sectors—in the context of the following thee over-arching 
trends: 
1. the explosive growth of online advertising; 
2. the faltering growth for the rest of advertising spending across all media. Although 
advertising spending has remained fairly fixed relative to the size of the Canadian economy 
for decades, over the past decade it has fallen by about 10%, or approximately $1.5 billion 
per year based on the value of advertising spending last year. As a result, traditional media 
sectors and firms that depend primarily on advertising funding as the core of their business 
model are battling internet giants like Google and Facebook for a stagnant/shrinking pool of 
revenue; 
3. the core of the media economy is not advertising but a rapidly growing group of pay-per 
media and digital AVMS that are based primarily on subscriber fees and direct payments, 
although after growing rapidly for three decades, specialty and pay TV services have seen 
their revenue taper off since 2016. 
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These over-arching trends, in turn, are taken up in relation to an analysis of the following digital and 




• pay and specialty TV
• online video subscriber and download services such as Netflix, Crave, Amazon Prime Video 
and Illico
• radio
• music, including recorded music, live concerts and revenues from publishing royalties
• online music subscription and download services such as Apple iTunes and Spotify
• online gaming, gaming applications, game downloads or in-game purchases






 } online advertising continues to grow rapidly, with nearly all growth 
captured by Google and Facebook. 
 } regulators must contend with the consequences of this duopoly not 
only in online advertising, but also to curb their ability to leverage 
that dominance into adjacent media sectors.
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While overall advertising spending has been 
buffeted by unsteady economic conditions 
for more than a decade, the growth of online 
advertising has continued to surge ahead. By last 
year, Internet advertising revenue in Canada had 
reached $8.8 billion—up from $7.7 billion a year 
before that and worth more than four times what 
it had been a decade ago. 
It is clear that the two biggest beneficiaries 
of this soaring growth have been Google and 
Facebook, with estimated revenue from online 
advertising of $4.4 billion and $2.6 billion, 
respectively, last year. Google single-handedly 
now accounts for half of the Internet advertising 
market, while Facebook’s share is rapidly 
approaching the one-third mark. Together, they 
controlled four-fifths of the online advertising 
market in Canada in 2019—up significantly from 
a little over two-thirds share of the market five 
years ago. 
Moreover, a majority of the new growth in Internet 
advertising revenue between 2018 and 2019 
ended up in their coffers, although the pace of 
this development was down substantially from 
previous years when Google and Facebook took 
four-out-of-five dollars in new growth. In short, 
the digital duopoly now stand in a league of 
their own and their grip on the online advertising 
market is tightening. 
Open the lens wider to examine the adverting 
spending in all media, e.g. Internet, television, 
radio, newspapers, magazines and out-of-
home—and the picture, however, becomes more 
complicated. 
First, total advertising spending in Canada last 
year reached $15.6 billion, but growth remains 
sluggish. Yet, within the context of the much 
larger but sluggish overall advertising market, 
Google and Facebook have emerged as the two 




light years ahead of Bell, Shaw, Rogers, Quebecor, 
Postmedia, Torstar and the CBC, in that order. 
Google, for example, now accounts for 28% of all 
advertising spending in Canada, while Facebook’s 
share has risen rapidly to just under 17% last 
year. 
In sum, the digital advertising behemoths had 
an outsized 45% stake of the advertising market 
last year, up from 36% two years earlier. Bell, 
by comparison, attracted just over 10% of all 
advertising spending in Canada at the time. All 
told, these changes have propelled Google into 
being the fifth largest company operating in the 
media economy in Canada, after Bell, Rogers, 
Telus and Shaw; Facebook comes seventh after 
Quebecor. 
That said, it is essential to simultaneously grasp 
the quick growing influence that Google and 
Facebook have amassed while not overstating 
the scale and scope of their clout across 
the media landscape. In the present case, 
for example, while their dominance of online 
advertising is clear-cut, their influence on the 
advertising market across all media requires a 
more nuanced assessment. 
On the one hand, there is little doubt that 
controlling more than a quarter of all advertising 
revenue in Canada gives Google enormous 
power over the advertising market. Google and 
Facebook’s combined market share of 45% 
points in a similar direction. On the other hand, 
however, the assessment is mixed when using 
standard indicators of market concentration. 
For example, using the CR4 method10, the 
“total advertising market” is only modestly 
concentrated, with the top four firms—Google, 
Facebook, Bell and Shaw (Corus)—accounting 
for 62% of the market. However, by the lights of 
the HHI approach, it remains highly competitive, 
with the HHI score of 1272 being at the low end 
of the scale (see “Internet Advertising Market 
share, 2014-2019” and “Ad$ All Media” sheets in 
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the Excel Workbook). We will deal more with the 
implications and possible responses to Google 
and Facebook’s lock on online advertising, and 
their growing influence over the advertising 
market writ large, and potential regulatory 
responses to that growing clout, in the second 
report in this year’s series.  
Within Canada and globally, Google’s dominance 
of online advertising is girded by the fact that it 
has vertically integrated its search and online 
advertising functions with its own proprietary 
digital advertising exchange, to say nothing 
of the dominant position it holds in relation to 
mobile and desktop browsers, the Android mobile 
operating system, and Google Play app store 
(typically in duopolistic rivalry with Apple in each 
of these areas). The cornerstone in Google’s 
sprawling reach across the Internet stack, 
however, is the online advertising system that it 
has assembled through a series of acquisitions 
over the last decade (e.g. DoubleClick, AdMob, 
etc.). By assembling its own online advertising 
exchange, Google has, in essence, erected a 
walled garden around its services as well as the 
buying and selling of audiences on the Internet, 
a stark contrast from its early promise to help 
people navigate the ‘open Internet’ and slay the 
walled gardens that had emerged in the late-
1990s. 
While Facebook does not have its own digital 
advertising exchange, both it and Google share 
the fact that they control the common currency 
used to buy and sell audiences and advertising 
inventory on the Internet: detailed and intimate 
knowledge of their audiences. Each company 
also has its own audience measurement and 
rating system that allows them to control the 
terms of trade upon which the online advertising 
system functions.11 By controlling the building 
blocks of the online advertising system both 
companies are able to effectively hold third party 






of them interconnect with one another, or with 
other digital platforms. Consequently, advertising 
campaigns, and the data, costs, and labour 
behind them, are not portable between competing 
advertising exchanges, thereby allowing Google 
and Facebook, in effect, to use this control 
to hold audiences and advertisers hostage. 
This raises the prospect of using mandated 
data portability, network interoperability and 
interconnection obligations to put a dent in their 
dominance(another point we will return to in the 
next report). 
For its part, Facebook had 21.5 million users in 
Canada at the end of 2019 and revenue of $2,614 
million. The company has benefitted in particular 
from the shift from “desktop Internet” to the 
mobile Internet. Thus, while Facebook had only a 
few dozen people working on the mobile Internet 
version of its app as late as 2012, by the end 
of that year it had done an about face as it set 
out to make the mobile Internet its new frontier 
of expansion. As a result, the mobile version 
of Facebook’s service is now the centre of the 
companies’ operations. 
The growth rate for the number of people using 
the company’s three main services—Facebook, 
Instagram and WhatsApp—in Canada has been 
swift, to say the least, over the past decade but 
it has slowed in recent years. Slowing growth 
in the size of Facebook’s user based has not 
caused revenue growth to stall, however, because 
the company has focused on sharply increasing 
the monetary value of each user. And it has 
succeeded at this as well. The annual average 
revenue per Facebook user (ARPU) in Canada 
last year was $121.58—double what it was three 
years ago and ten times what it was in 2011.12 
Figure 13 below depicts the growth of Facebook’s 
revenue and ARPU in Canada since 2011. 
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Source: see “App Economy” sheet in the Excel Workbook. 
In sum, Google and Facebook have become 
major players in Canada in a short period of time. 
They form a duopoly in Internet advertising and 
the scope of their influence is growing in relation 
to the overall advertising market. Based on these 
trends, it has become an article of faith in many 
quarters—academic, industry, think tanks and 
advocacy groups, policy-makers and regulators—
that Google and Facebook are primarily to blame 
for the existential crisis now being faced by 
the media in Canada. While this account of the 
domestic media industries being decimated by a 
clutch of rapacious Internet giants headquartered 
in Silicon Valley might seem to be compelling at 
first blush, it is superficial and deeply misleading. 
For one, most sectors of the content media are 
vibrant and have grown considerably over the 
thirty-five years covered by our project. However, 
there are four exceptions to this general rule: 
broadcasting television, radio, newspapers 
and magazines, all of which rely primarily on 
advertising funding and have been in decline 
since 2008. 
While advertising continues to be the most 
significant source of revenue for the media 
content sectors, it is swiftly being eclipsed by 
others that depend mainly on subscriber fees 
and direct payments. For example, revenue for 
specialty and pay TV services doubled in the last 
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decade to $4.4 billion in 2016, before tapering off 
to $4.2 billion last year. Simultaneously, however, 
subscription-based and download video and 
music services as well as online games, apps, 
downloads and app stores are rapidly becoming 
the engines of growth across the AVMS sectors. 
The combined revenue for these sectors soared 
eight-fold from $719 million to $5.6 billion 
between 2011 and last year. Taken in their 
entirety, and in sharp contrast to the usual story, 
there is no general crisis of the media in Canada 
and the content media sectors have grown 
immensely over time: their revenue in 1984, was 
$5.6 billion; last year it was $27.7 billion. 
Figure 14 below depicts the long-term growth 
of the content media sectors over the period 
covered by this project. 
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Source: see the “Media Economy” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
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As Internet Advertising Soars, Total Advertising 
Spending Slumps
Growth for nearly all content media sectors was steady, even brisk, until the financial crisis of 2008, 
except for several years in the early 1990s recession and again just after the collapse of the dot.com 
bubble at the turn-of-the-century. Since 2008, however, revenue for advertising-funded AVMS sectors 
have fallen sharply, while those based on subscriber fees and direct purchases have proved far more 
resilient and, in the vast majority of cases, have grown rapidly. These ongoing trends and patterns 
reflect the fact that advertising spending—and thus the fate of advertising-funded media—follows the 
twists and turns of the economy in lockstep fashion (see Picard, Garnham, Miege, and Vogel). 
Since 2008, total advertising spending has slowed, stagnated or shrunk, in real dollar terms, relative to 
the size of the Canadian economy (gross domestic income), in relation to the size of the media econ-
omy and on a per capita basis. Although this trend has abated in the past two- to three years, the “lost 
decade” before that brought about by slumping, stagnant and/or slow advertising growth since 2008 
means that $800 million to $2.3 billion in ad revenue per year has vanished relative to what it would 
have otherwise been had “normal” growth rates held steady—roughly a billion-and-a-half dollars per 
year if we split the difference.13 Figure 15 below illustrates the wreckage.
13	 	The	range	depends	on	which	measure	is	used	to	assess	the	situation,	e.g.	real$	vs	current$	and	per	capita	
spending	or	advertising	spending	as	a	percentage	of	GDI	or	the	network	media	economy.	
Since 2008, total advertising spending has 
slowed, stagnated or shrunk, in real dollar terms, 
relative to the size of the Canadian economy 
(gross domestic income), in relation to the size of 
the media economy and on a per capita basis.
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All told, the contraction in advertising spending has hit the four sectors of the media that have 
historically been the most reliant on advertising hard: broadcast television, radio, newspapers and 
magazines. Collectively, their revenue has plummeted by $4.9 billion since 2008. This trend is unlikely 
to turn around any time soon. 
That the fate of advertising spending—and thus 
the media that rely on it—hinges on the state 
of the economy can be seen by tracking the 
ups and downs of advertising revenue since 
2008. During this time, for example, advertising 
spending grew from $11.5 billion to $15.6 billion 
in nominal terms. However, almost all of that 
growth occurred in the last three years. Also, if 
you switch the metric to real dollars, the story is 
even grimmer; revenue hovered between $13.5 
and $14 billion from 2008 to 2015 (CAGR of 
.44%) before slowly rising again to $15.6 billion 
last year (i.e. CAGR of 1.3%). 
Figure 16 below reveals the period of relatively 
low to no growth between 2010 and 2016, and 
the slow increase since, as well as changes over 
time in terms of which media type gets how 
much of the advertising pie.  
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Source: see “Media Economy” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
The contraction in 
advertising spending 
has hit the four sectors 
of the media that have 
historically been the most 
reliant on advertising 
hard: broadcast television, 
radio, newspapers and 
magazines. 
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Figure 16: The Stagnating Advertising Economy, 2004-2019, I—Advertising Revenue 
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Source: see the “Ad$ All Media” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
Looking at advertising revenue on a per capita basis (in real dollars), advertising spending fell 
sharply from $405.90 per person in 2008 to $388.20, then bounced around at relatively low levels 
for a decade, before finally returning to its previous levels in the last year or two. In 2019, advertising 
spending was $420.10 per capita—a painfully slow CAGR of .33% for just over a decade. In terms of 
advertising earmarked for television, it has slid continuously from the first decade of the 21st Century 
when it hovered around $110-$120 per person (in real dollars) to $84.40 per capita last year. The 
fortunes of Internet advertising, of course, have run in exactly the opposite direction, quadrupling 
from $57 per person in 2008 to $233 last year. Figure 17 below depicts these points. 
In 2019, advertising spending was $420.10 per capita— 
a painfully slow CAGR of .33% for just over a decade. 
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Source: see the “Ad$ All Media” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
Advertising spending levels remain lower 
today than they were a decade ago. 
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Figure 18 below also reveals a pattern of stagnating or shrinking advertising spending relative to the 
size of the network media economy over the last decade. In this case, advertising spending levels 
remain lower today than they were a decade ago. 








Source: see the “Ad$ All Media” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
The downward pressure on advertising can also be seen in terms of GDI, as shown in Figure 19 below. 
Historically, advertising spending as a portion of the Canadian economy has stayed relatively fixed 
at roughly .68 to .7% of gross domestic income (GDI), a rate, incidentally, that is significantly lower 
than in the United States, probably serving as an index of the less commercialized character of the 
media and society in Canada relative to the US. In 2019, however, after nearly a decade of anemic and 
unsteady economic growth, this measure, too, still sat at the lower ends of that range. 
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Source: see the “Ad$ All Media” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
The upshot of these observations cannot be understated. While Google and Facebook are 
undoubtedly implicated in the dire situation faced by those media sectors and firms that rely primarily 
on advertising revenue as the centre of their business models, they are not the primary cause of it.  
Instead, the situation reflects a confluence of structural conditions stemming from the state of the 
economy as well as self-inflicted wounds incurred over a quarter-of-a-century of excessive mergers 
and acquisitions that have since taken their toll (see the next report for more detail). To date, however, 
those who blame Google and Facebook for stealing away ad revenue from media companies in 
Canada—and precipitating a “crisis of the media”—have had nothing to say about these other deeper 
and broader forces, preferring to focus the blame on a convenient scapegoat—the “Web Giants”—
innstead. 
While Google and Facebook are undoubtedly implicated in the 
dire situation faced by those media sectors and firms that rely 
primarily on advertising revenue as the centre of their business 
models, they are not the primary cause of it. 
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The Rumoured Death of 
Television is Much Exaggerated
The following pages examine the different segments of the content media in more detail while ex-
tending the analysis from the above focus about advertising-funded media to those that rely primarily 
on subscriber fees and direct payments. 
Anchor Findings
 } Broadcast television has been in decline since 2011. 
 } After several decades of strong growth, specialty and pay television 
services have also seen revenue slip since 2016. 
 } Rather than cannibalizing existing revenues, online video services 
have substantially grown the market for audiovisual media content in 
Canada. 
 } Canada’s film and television production industry has seen record 
high investment in new productions in the past several years, with 
investment levels in 2019 nearly double what they were a decade 
ago. 
 } The integration of broadcasting and pay television industries with one 
another—and into the operations of the country’s largest telecoms 
operators—is unique to Canada and may have dampened competitive 
pressure and reduced their ability to respond to market developments 
and broader shifts in AVMS, as seen in other international markets.
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Advertising for broadcast television grew more 
or less steadily until reaching a high point of 
$2.5 billion in 2010 and 2011. Despite suffering 
the initial shock of the 2008 financial crisis like 
the rest of the commercial media, advertising 
revenue for broadcast television rebounded for 
the next few years but the reprieve was short-
lived. Despite some fluctuations along the way, 
advertising spending on broadcast television has 
dropped from $2.5 billion in 2011 to $1.8 billion 
last year. The shift of some advertising dollars 
to specialty cable and satellite channels such 
as Discovery, TSN, RSN, the Cartoon Network, 
etc. has helped to recover some of the slack, but 
overall advertising across the total TV landscape 
has declined from a high of $3.8 billion in 2011 to 
$3.1 billion last year.
We see similar trends playing out in the radio 
sector, where revenues peaked in 2011, at 
$2,016 million (including the CBC’s parliamentary 
appropriation). They have fallen slowly but 
steadily since, reaching $1,779 million last year 
(current dollars). 
Cut-backs by the previous Conservative 
Government to the CBC of $126 million after 
2012, and the loss of $121.1 million in payments 
from the Local Program Improvement Fund 
after 2013 until it was phased out completely 










the CBC and broadcast television stations 
earlier this decade (see the CBC, Annual 
Reports and the CRTC, CBC Aggregate Annual 
Return French and English for these years).
Overall broadcast TV revenues, including the 
CBC and its annual Parliamentary funding, slid 
from an all-time high in 2011 of $3,501.7 million 
to $2,518.6 million last year—a 28% decline. As 
a result of these trends, eight local TV stations 
have been shuttered since 2009: CHCA (Red 
Deer), CKNX (Midwest ON), CKX (Brandon), Sun 
News (Toronto), three of Rogers Omni affiliates 
in BC, Alberta and Ontario, and another station 
in Kenora that was closed by Shaw in 2017 
(Lindgren & Corbett, 2020). 
Alongside these trends, job lay-offs and cut-
backs have become a constant theme. Between 
2012 and 2015, for example, local news staff at 
broadcast TV stations was cut by 4%, according 
to Colette Brin’s contribution to the Reuters 
Institute’s 2016 Digital News Report (p. 80).14
A study prepared for the Friends of Canadian 
Broadcasting and Unifor by Peter Miller (2015) 
estimated that half the local TV stations in fifty-
six small and mid-size cities across Canada, and 
an additional 900 jobs, could be lost by 2020 
if the major policy changes advocated by the 
report were not adopted (pp. 14-15). While such 
Broadcast TV and Radio
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outcomes would decimate local broadcasting if 
they came to pass, we have reached the date of 
that dire scenario and can say that the report’s 
predictions have not come to pass. This outcome, 
in turn, serves as a reminder that ongoing tallies 
of job losses as well as predictions from lobby 
groups and hired consultants along the lines just 
reviewed are often sensationalist and wide of 
their mark. 
Conditions have been severe enough, however, to 
have spawned two reviews in 2016 of the state 
of local news and journalism in communities, 
one by the Canadian Heritage Parliamentary 
Committee and another by the CRTC. Both 
reviews added further insights into the situation 
but ultimately struggled to come up with 
workable solutions to the problems at hand. That 
said, they were part and parcel of broad ranging 
efforts in many quarters that led the Liberal 
Government later that year to add $675 million 
to the CBC’s annual funding envelope spread out 
over the next five years. While these new funds 
countered the cuts to the CBC undertaken by the 
previous government, they do not come close to 
offsetting the decline in advertising revenue at 
the CBC.
In sum, four points help to explain the stagnation 
and decline of broadcast TV over the last decade:
•	 declining advertising revenue since 2011;
•	 budget cuts to the CBC;
•	 the phasing out of the Local Program 
Improvement Fund between 2012 and 
2015;
•	 the big four commercial TV providers – 
Shaw, Bell, Rogers and Quebecor – shift 
of resources from their broadcast TV 
holdings to the vast stable of pay, specialty 
and other subscriber-based TV services 
that they own (i.e. mobile, IPTV) (see the 
CRTC’s Individual Financial Summaries for 
a list of the 105 pay and specialty services 
the big four combined owned as of 2019).
While the dire condition of broadcast TV in 
Canada is obvious, a crucial question remains as 
to why things are so poor relative to conditions 
in the US and some other countries? To put this 
another way, while broadcast TV is not thriving 
anywhere, the turmoil in Canada is especially 
severe. Why?
While we must be cautious about identifying any 
one cause for the dramatically different situations 
in Canada versus the US (and elsewhere), one key 
difference stands out: broadcast TV providers 
in the US (and elsewhere) are not nearly as 
integrated into the telecoms-Internet sectors 
and specialty and pay TV services as they are in 
Canada (a point that will be taken up in greater 
detail in the second report of our annual series). 
In fact, broadcast TV ownership groups in the US 
are sizeable, independent entities in their own 
right, unlike Canada—where all of the biggest 
commercial broadcast TV as well as pay and 
specialty TV services are owned by one and the 
same players, e.g. Bell, Shaw (Corus), Rogers 
and Quebecor (see FCC, 2018, para 90). Other 
than Comcast’s ownership of NBC Universal, 
for example, none of the main broadcast TV 
ownership groups in the US have been owned 
by telecoms companies or BDUs (although this 
changed somewhat after AT&T’s take-over of 
a raft of pay television services, including HBO, 
when it acquired Time Warner in 2018) (see FCC, 
2018, para 67). 
Yet, even accounting for AT&T’s acquisition 
of Time Warner in 2018, Canada still stands 
alone from its international peers in terms of its 
extraordinarily high levels of diagonal and vertical 
integration across the entirety of the network 
media economy (for a fuller elaboration of this 
claim, see CMCRP, 2016). Despite this, the current 
chair of the CRTC acknowledges the high levels 
of vertical integration in Canada but appears to 
take a sanguine view of such matters when he, 
incorrectly, asserts that “this trend toward vertical 
integration was not unique to Canada” (Scott, 
2019).
The existence of separate broadcast TV and 
pay TV ownership groups in the US creates 
conditions that drive them to compete head-on 
 } declining advertising revenue since 
2011;
 } budget cuts to the CBC;
 } the phasing out of the Local Pro-
gram Improvement Fund between 
2012 and 2015;
 } the big four commercial TV pro-
viders – Shaw, Bell, Rogers and 
Quebecor – shift of resources from 
their broadcast TV holdings to the 
vas  stable f pay, specialty and 
other subscriber-ba ed TV s rvi es
that th y wn (i.e. obile, IPTV) 
(see the CRTC’s Individual Financi l 
Summaries for a list of the 105 pay 
and specialty serv ces the big four 
combined owne  as of 2019).
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with one another rather than to function as arms 
of the telecoms giants that then operate with one 
eye fixed on their rivals and the other on ensuring 
that whatever competitive strategies they adopt 
do not side-swipe other aspects of their vertically 
and diagonally-integrated telecoms-Internet and 
TV operations. Conditions similar to those in the 
US also hold true in Europe.
These observations mean two things of critical 
importance that have negatively affected the 
state of broadcast television in Canada. First, 
since broadcast television stations are generally 
not vertically-integrated into cable and telecoms 
companies in the US and Europe, they have more 
incentives to pursue a major additional source 
of revenue over and above advertising revenue: 
retransmission fees (Evens & Donders, 2018, ch. 
5). In the US, retransmission fees account for 
nearly a third of broadcast television stations’ 
revenue (see FCC, 2018, paras 97-101). In Europe, 
retransmission fee rates vary greatly from up 
to a third in some Scandinavian countries but 
10% in Belgium, while in the UK, retransmission 
fees are zero and broadcasters even pay Sky, the 
dominant pay-television distributor, for carriage 
(Evens & Donders, 2018, ch. 5). In Canada, 
an attempt to introduce a “value-for-signal” 
regime earlier this decade was defeated as the 
integrated BDUs, satisfied with the status quo, 
resisted the idea that their cable operations 
would have to pay into the broadcast TV 
operators’ coffers. 
Second, because of their independent ownership, 
stand-alone broadcast TV services in the US 
compete vigorously with specialty and pay 
TV services as well as online video rivals like 
Netflix, Hulu, CBS All Access, Disney+, Viacom-
owned PlutoTV and Amazon Prime. Indeed, big 
broadcast groups in the US are sizeable entities 
in their own right; notable examples include CBS, 
Sinclair, TEGNA, Comcast, E.W. Scripps, Gray, 
Nexstar, Univision, Walt Disney, Fox, and Media 
General. Other than Disney (the ABC network) and 
15	 	That	is,	not	being	vertically-integrated	into	cable	and	telecoms	carriers,	or	diagonally	integrated	with	pay	TV	
services.
Fox, however, broadcast TV ownership groups 
tend not to also own a fleet of specialty and pay 
TV services–again, unlike Canada—where all of 
the large commercial broadcast TV as well as pay 
and specialty TV services are owned by one and 
the same players, e.g. Bell, Shaw (Corus), Rogers 
and Quebecor. 
Consequently, the US broadcasters are more 
eager to exploit the opportunities of putting 
their programming online to allow audiences to 
watch programs from anywhere using any device 
and to engage in “catch-up” viewing outside the 
constraints of the over-the-air broadcast schedule 
than their Canadian counterparts. Putting 
programming online also opens a new line of 
advertising revenue that they have exploited to 
far greater extent than Canadian broadcasters. 
As a result, online advertising has contributed 
more to the bottom line of broadcast television 
stations in the US than in Canada, growing from 
5% of their revenue in 2012 to 8% in 2017 (FCC, 
2017, para 119; (see FCC, 2018, para. 101). By 
contrast, online advertising revenue for television 
services in Canada lags considerably, rising 
from 3.2% in 2012 to 6% in 2019 (see the Ad$ All 
Media sheet in the Excel Workbook). 
In other words, common ownership of 
distribution and broadcast services has taken 
significant sources of revenue off the table for 
broadcasters in Canada. This has no doubt 
contributed to the severity of their woes. Yet, 
once again, instead of considering these self-
induced structural sources of the plight of 
broadcasting in Canada, however, most observers 
are content to blame the Internet, GAFAM and 
Netflix. 
In addition, as a result of their structural 
independence,15 broadcast TV ownership groups 
in other countries are compelled to compete 
vigorously on their own—they sink or swim on 
the merits of their service offerings. Unlike their 
Canadian counterparts, they have no integrated 
37
or affiliated operations in adjacent markets to fall back on or strategically consider. The results of this 
dynamic can be seen, for instance, in the fact that the number of US households that are broadcast-
only has steadily risen in recent years, from 10% in 2015 to 13% in 2017 (see FCC, 2016; FCC, 2018, 
para 109). Broadcast network affiliates’ and independent TV stations’ “total day share of viewing” has 
also increased from 30% in the 2012-2013 to 33% in the 2015-2016 season, while prime time viewing 
rose from 33% to 36% over the same period. Overall, broadcast TV revenue in the US rose from $24.3 
billion in 2013 to $30.7 billion in 2017 as well (see FCC, 2018, para. 101; FCC, 2017, paras 116-119; 
FCC, 2016, paras 116-119).  
Pay and Specialty (Subscription) TV
For all the woes affecting broadcast TV, the overall TV universe continues to expand and to offer 
people a richer and more diverse range of choices. Looking beyond the Cassandra calls of industry-
friendly policy rhetoric, one quickly discovers vibrant, new centres of development, while established 
operators are forced to adapt to changes in technology, the structure of markets, and how people 
watch and use television. As has been emphasized throughout this report, the real growth in 
television has been in subscriber fees and the pay-per and internet-based streaming and download 
audiovisual media services—a case that it is just as true in Canada as it is in many countries around 
the world.
The UK regulator, Ofcom, underscores the point: “Subscription revenues [worldwide] continue to be 
the key driver of this growth, rising by 5.4% to reach £125bn, just over half of total revenue”, and a 
cumulative annual growth rate of 5.3% over the last five years (Ofcom, 2015, pp. 139-141). As Ofcom’s 
(2017) most recent report observes, “Pay TV remains the largest source of TV revenue across 
comparators” (p. 97). The same applies to Canada.
Once we widen the lens to look at the fastest growing areas of television, it is clear the chorus of 
voices declaring the supposed “death of television” are singing off key. Specialty and pay TV services, 
online video streaming and download services, and IPTV have all done especially well. Pay and 
specialty TV services are a case in point. During the first decade-and-a-half of the 21st Century, the 
number of such services operating in Canada soared, and so did revenue, although that pace has 
stalled since 2016.
Specialty and pay TV revenue eclipsed that of broadcast TV in 2010, when revenues reached $3,474.6 
million. By 2019, specialty and pay TV revenue was $4,233.1 million—down from its all-time high of 
$4,415.6 million in 2016. Today, the new engine of growth is shifting to online video streaming and 
download services.
Yet, as with broadcast television, the high levels of vertical integration between telecoms and cable 
operators, on the one side, and pay TV services, on the other, and diagonal integration between both 
broadcasting and pay TV services, has compromised the business viability of pay television services 
in several respects. First, as we saw a moment ago for broadcast TV, in the US, UK and Europe, where 
high-levels of vertical and diagonal integration do not hold sway, pay TV providers have been quicker 
to unbundle specialty and premium pay TV services from an underlying cable subscription and to 
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make them available over the Internet. Examples 
include Time Warner’s HBO (although this, too, 
has been clawed back after Time Warner’s 
integration into AT&T), Disney’s ESPN and 
Disney+, several services owned by Viacom-CBS, 
and major sports leagues like the NFL and MLB. 
As AVMS providers only, these operators’ goal is 
simple: to get their programming before as many 
people across as many platforms as possible 
with less concern that offering their services over 
the Internet and mobile wireless networks might 
cannibalize the subscriber and revenue base 
of an affiliated BDU—at least not to the same 
degree, since BDUs are still their main source of 
revenue (see FCC, 2018, paras 76-81, 101). 
In short, the highly consolidated and integrated 
structure of the television market in Canada 
discourages the development of stand-alone 
video-on-demand services delivered over the 
Internet by the big four vertically-integrated 
communications and media conglomerates, i.e. 
Bell, Shaw, Rogers and Quebecor. Thus, HBO in 
Canada, for example, is currently locked up with 
Bell under an exclusive contract that runs until 
2025. All-in-all, these entities owned 105 of the 
most lucrative specialty and pay TV services last 
year, and accounted for four-fifths of all revenue 
in this sector. 
The “big four” are not only loath to offer their own 
specialty and pay TV services on a stand-alone 
basis lest it threaten their lucrative BDU services, 
but their approach also constrains the actions 
of independent operators. In fact, services like 
Crave, Shomi and Club illico were only made 
available on a stand-alone basis after the CRTC 
prodded them into doing so (CRTC, 2015). 
Returning to independent television services, 
when they contract for carriage with a BDU 
they essentially provide two services for one 
wholesale rate. The first service is the linear 
channel which is bundled with other channels 
and marketed by the BDUs, and for which they 
get a per subscriber fee and a pledge to reach 
a certain percentage of subscribers. At the 
same time, independents’ second service—their 
“On-Demand” content, including that which is 
delivered over the Internet—is essentially given 
away for free to the BDUs who use it as part 
of a “bundle” to retain subscribers rather than 
treating it as a new line of revenue. Obviously, 
this sacrifices a potentially lucrative new stream 
of revenue in the name of preserving the “cable-
centric broadcasting system” around which 
Canada’s cultural policy has been built since the 
1970s. 
By giving away their on-demand content 
“for free” in this way, independent pay TV 
services essentially abandon the potential 
to earn additional revenue from one of their 
most attractive assets: online access to their 
programming from anywhere, using any device. 
Moreover, they are also trading dimes on the 
potential dollars that they might obtain from 
going with a online VOD service such as Apple or 
Amazon. 
In sum, the policy-driven state of consolidation 
and exceptionally high levels of vertical 
integration has put Canada into an undesirable 
league of its own. In so doing, what was 
supposed to be a panacea for Canada’s 
supposedly small media economy has, in fact, 
hobbled the business viability of television 
services significantly. Under the current 
arrangements, the benefits of choice and agency 
for users, as well as potential new streams 
of revenue and distribution opportunities for 
smaller players in the industry, are sacrificed 
in favour of preserving a handful of vertically-
integrated “national champions” who stand 
astride the communications and broadcasting 
system in Canada. They may present themselves 
as guardians of Canadian culture when in fact 
they more closely resemble jealous gatekeepers 
preserving their own interests.  
Lastly, the structure of the communications and 
television landscape in Canada also gives rise 
to one other crucial condition that continues to 
hobble the advent of online video subscription 
services. In this respect, it is important to note 
that not only are all the major commercial 
television services owned by telecoms 
companies but there are no stand-alone mobile 
wireless operators left after Shaw acquired 
Wind (now rebranded as Freedom) in 2016. This 
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is important because, without a stand-alone, competitive mobile phone operator, prices for mobile 
phone service and data tend to be higher and data caps significantly lower, and the cost of exceeding 
them steeper. The upshot is that the steep price of data, restrictive data limits and expensive overage 
charges deter the use of new media to consume all forms of audiovisual content, including broadcast 
TV (see Rewheel, 2016; Rewheel, 2018). Forward looking communication and media policy should 
pay close attention to these considerations and evaluate what has been gained and lost by tying the 
fate of audiovisual media services to vertically-integrated national champions.  
Online Subscription and Download Audiovisual 
Media Services (AVMS)
In order to complete the picture of the “Total TV Universe” we now examine online video subscription 
and download services. At the outset, however, it must be acknowledged that doing so is difficult 
given the dearth of reliable publicly available information, not only from the service providers (e.g. 
Netflix, Amazon Video, Apple, Bell’s Crave or Rogers’ SN Now) but from the CRTC as well. That said, 
it is possible to develop sound estimates based on these companies’ annual reports, recent changes 
to how Netflix reports its operating results to US regulators, taking into account year-over-year growth 
for other providers and using publicly available information.16 
Since Netflix first entered Canada in late 2010, many new players have joined the fray, including 
BCE’s Crave, Amazon Prime, Apple TV+ and iTunes, Club illico, CBC Gem, Google Play as well as that 
company’s YouTube Premium and Subscription services, while a few services, such as Rogers and 
Shaw’s joint venture, shomi, have exited the scene. Others continue to enter the market on an ongoing 
basis, such as Disney+ entry into Canada late last year. The analysis in this report, however, focuses 
on the biggest online video services operating in Canada for the better part of 2019.
In 2019, estimated revenue for the online AVMS market in Canada reached $2.1 billion. Growth 
continued to be swift based with a compound annual growth rate of 33% over the past three years 
and revenues more than tripling from $648.1 million in 2016. 
Netflix is the biggest online video service player in Canada by far. While it has been difficult to 
estimate its subscriber and revenue numbers in the past, this has become easier since December 
2019, when the company changed how its reports its financial and operating results to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission in the United States. These changes allow us to break out revenue and 
subscriber figures, respectively, for the US, which leaves a residual in both cases from its broader US-
Canada (UCAN) region that can be attributed to Canada (see Netflix (21/01/2020). Form 8-K SEC, pp. 







Thus, at the end of 2019, Netflix had 6.62 million subscribers in Canada, up nearly 350,000 over the 
previous year. As a result, nearly half of all households (46%) in Canada subscribed to Netflix by the 
end of 2019. The company’s Canadian revenue reached $1.1 billion last year, up from $822.6 million 
the year before and triple what they had been just five years earlier. 
Bell’s streaming service Crave is the second largest SVOD service in Canada. Last year it had 2.6 
million subscribers at year end and estimated revenue of $292.5 million. Apple, Google and Amazon’s 
estimated revenues for online video services in Canada in 2019 were $202.8 million, $147.4 million 
and $139.5 million, respectively. Add the estimated revenues for Rogers SNN ($172.7 million), 
Quebecor’s illico ($52.3 million) and CBC Gem ($13.6 million), respectively, and total revenue for 
online video services in Canada in 2019 was an estimated $2.093 million. 
Figure 20 below depicts the revenues of the major digital AVMS operators in Canada last year. 
Figure 20: Online Video Subscription and Download Services in Canada, 2012, 2015 
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Shaw Quebecor
CBC Gem
Source: see the “Top 20 with Telecoms” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
Our estimates diverge significantly from those that the CRTC has published in its annual 
Communications Monitoring Report for the past three years (see, for example, CRTC, CMR 2019, pp, 
165-168). While the Commission has provided some useful insights into the fast-paced growth of 
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Netflix, Amazon Video, Apple’s iTunes, etc., its estimates for the revenues and subscriber numbers for 
foreign online AVMS providers have been implausibly high. The recent changes to Netflix’s reporting 
methods, in fact, reveal that the CRTC’s estimate for Netflix’s 2018 revenue in Canada of $1,643 
million is double what the company itself now discloses. 
The same assumptions that led to these inflated results for Netflix also appear to underpin the 
Commission’s estimates for all of the other foreign streaming and download video services it covers: 
Amazon Prime Video, Apple, Microsoft Movies & TV, Google Play, and so on. The overall effect, in turn, 
is to inflate the bottom-line value of the online subscription and download video market as a whole. 
Last year’s figures from the CRTC, for example, reinforce that impression by stating that total revenue 
for subscription and download video services soared by about seventy percent, shooting up as a 
result from $1.8 billion in 2017 to over $3 billion last year. (compare, for example, CRTC, CMR 2019, p. 
165 with CRTC, CMR 2018, p. 249). 
As indicated above, a more accurate figure is about half that amount. The consequence is not just 
that individual companies’ revenues are inflated, but the influence of international online video 
services in Canada as a whole relative to domestic players such as Bell’s Crave, Quebecor’s Club illico, 
Rogers SNN, and the CBC’s Gem. Curiously, the CRTC does not publish results for domestic online 
video services, furthering the impression that the data is being selectively presented. It also unduly 
handicaps independent research.
Beyond questions about the veracity of the CRTC’s numbers, we are also concerned that its estimates 
are being used as a kind of “threat inflation” that serve its own interests in bureaucratic expansion 
while also playing into the hands of those who claim that the scale of international online video 
service operations pose a mortal threat to Canadian broadcasters and to Canadian culture. This looks 
a lot more like a captured regulator rather than one that is committed to furthering the public interest. 
At the same time, the publication of such erroneous estimates under the CRTC’s imprimatur gives 
them a sheen of legitimacy that others trade on in the context of domestic political and policy battles 
over what a new generation of Internet regulation in Canada should like. This is, for example, what the 
Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review Panel’s (2020) Canada’s Communications 
Future report does as it recycles the Commission’s estimates for Netflix, Apple, Amazon, Google, etc. 
to make the case for creating a new category of “media content undertakings” that it recommends 
bringing under the CRTC’s jurisdiction via a revamped Broadcasting Act (BTLR, 2020, p. 123). That 
roadmap, in turn, animates the proposed revisions to the Broadcasting Act recently tabled by the 
Liberal Government that seek to do just this (Canada, 2020).
Equally troubling, the Commission itself seems to be actively putting its thumb on the scales in favour 
of such policy outcomes given the current chair’s calls for an ISP-levy to fund Canadian content and 
sanguine views on the exceptionally high levels of policy-driven vertical integration and ownership 
consolidation that have taken place in Canada. A similar tone was also set in the Commission’s 2018 
report, Harnessing Change: the Future of Programming Distribution in Canada.
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The Total Television Landscape in Perspective
Putting these differences between our estimates of the online video services marketplace and the 
views of the Commission aside, based on the evidence that we do have, the television marketplace 
is thriving, even if some of its elements (e.g. broadcast TV) are in deep trouble. Looking at the big 
picture that includes broadcast TV, specialty and pay TV services as well as online video services—
and an unmistakable picture emerges: total TV revenue has grown nearly five-fold from $1.8 billion in 
1984 to $8.8 billion last year.
Figure 21 below takes this big picture approach to illustrate the growth of the total television 
marketplace over time. 












1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
(2)
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Conv TV Spec and Pay TV $ Online Video (SVOD + OVOD)
Source: see the “Media Economy” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
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The changes that have taken place in the last decade alongside the rise of the Internet are, indeed, 
significant. For instance, Netflix’s share of all TV revenue has grown from zero nearly a decade ago 
to more than 12% last year. It is now the fifth largest television operator in the country, after Bell, 
Shaw (Corus), Rogers and the CBC and more than twice the size of Quebecor. Add in Amazon Prime 
Video and Apple iTunes and, based on our estimates, the big three US-based digital AVMS giants had 
a combined revenue last year of nearly $1.6 billion in Canada, or about 18% of all television revenue 
across the broadcast, pay and specialty service and online video services. In sum, the online video 
services have added immensely to the size and diversity of the TV market, and their revenue still 
continues to climb strongly (more on this in the next report in this series).
The fact that TV services based on subscriber fees (rather than advertising) continue to grow briskly 
even in the face of economic headwinds over much of the last decade also reveals another crucial 
point: the TV business has shifted to the direct pay-per model. Subscriber fees, as noted at the 
outset of this report, are now the centre of the content media universe, and this is especially true for 
television, where advertising’s share of revenue since the turn-of-the-21st Century has shrunk from 
accounting for about two-thirds of all revenue to just over a third last year. This is also important 
because the pay-per model is more resilient to economic shocks compared to advertising revenue, 
although this shift raises pressing questions in terms of affordability and inequalities of access after 
nearly a century of policies that have tried to foster universal and affordable broadcasting services.
If we add cable, satellite and IPTV distribution to this portrait the trend is clear: sum up all the 
elements of “Total TV” and TV distribution sectors17 and the TV marketplace accounted for nearly 
$17.1 billion in revenue in 2019 based on our figures, or $20.1 billion if the CRTC’s estimates are 
used. To put it another way, in 1984, all segments of the TV industry combined accounted for 13% 
of revenue across the media economy. That figure is now just under 20%–a slight dip over the last 
decade but a clear indication all-the-same that television is still a main pillar of the Internet- and 
mobile-centric media universe. Figure 22 illustrates the trends.
17	 	This	includes	broadcast	TV,	pay	and	specialty	TV,	online	video	services	and	BDUs.
The big three US-based digital AVMS giants had a 
combined revenue last year of nearly $1.6 billion 
in Canada, or about 18% of all television revenue 
across the broadcast, pay and specialty service and 
online video services. 
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Figure 22: Television at the Centre of the Network Media Economy Universe, 1984-
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Internet-based Video (CRTC) Total TV (CMCR)
Total TV (CRTC)
Sources: see the “Media Economy” sheets in the Excel Workbook
There is yet another indicator that television in Canada is vibrant and undergoing a phase of 
extraordinary growth: soaring investment in television and film production. Indeed, total television and 
film production in Canada jumped from $5.4 billion in 2008 to a record high of $9.3 billion last year. 
Figure 23 below depicts the trends. While Canadian investment rose modestly in the first half of the 
last decade, during the past five years it has been Netflix, Amazon and Hulu that have been driving the 
trend as the they ramp up their investment in original productions. Production and post-production 
facilities as well as film and television production crews in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec have 
been the main beneficiaries (Nordicity, 2019, p. 60). 
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Canadian Theatrical/Feature Film Broadcaster In-House
Canadian TV Foreign Location service
Total
Sources: Nordicity (2020). Economic Profile, Exhibit 1-2 Total volume of film and TV production in Canada 
(Study prepared for CMPA, Heritage Canada, Telefilm Canada & Association Québécoise de la production 
médiatique); CMPA/Heritage Canada (2018). Economic Profile, Exhibit 1-2 Total volume of film and TV 
production in Canada; CMPA (2010). Economic Profile, Exhibit 1-1 Total volume of film and TV production 
in Canada. See the “Film & TV Production” sheet in the Excel Workbook. 
Such trends are not unique to Canada, either. They are also visible in the United States and the EU, 
for example, where a revival of investment in film and television production by the traditional studios 
has taken place after it fell off in the immediate wake of the financial crisis a little over a decade ago. 
Similar to Canada, this increase is being driven by massive investments from streaming services such 
as Netflix and Amazon Prime (Spangler, 2020; IBIS, 2019a; IBIS, 2019b; Eurostat, 2020).
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Policy in Canada has long sought to attract as much of foreign investment as possible into the 
production of film and TV for both international and domestic distribution, and on this measure, the 
policy has enjoyed much success. While some commentators complain that this new investment is 
for production in Canada by foreign companies destined for foreign markets, this is a short-sighted 
view because investments in foreign location productions—as this type of production is called—
lead to lasting local capacity creation, in terms of creative talent, skilled production and production 
facilities, as Serra Tinic’s On Location: Canada’s Television Industry in a Global Market landmark 
study of these issues observed in the early 2000s. Once projects financed by Hollywood film studios 
or, in today’s context, Netflix and Amazon are done and gone, they still leave an enduring legacy that 
benefits that production of television, film and other kinds of media content in Canada. 
The overall upshot of such observations is that television and film production in Canada is thriving 
and at record high levels. Thus, before we heed calls for an ISP levy, carving out even bigger 
exceptions to the Income Tax Act to tilt the playing field in favour of advertising spending in Canadian 
media versus US-based Internet giants like Google and Facebook, or similar such steps to “harness” 
future media and cultural policy to a very particular (peculiar) and constrained Canadian conception 
of television, it is useful to pause and reflect on the above observations to ask just what the problem 
is that these measures aim to solve?
Of course, all of the evidence does not point in one direction, either. For example, the time the people 
spend watching television “the old-fashioned way” has fallen by nearly three hours per week over the 
last half decade. That decline, however, has been more than offset by a rise in TV viewing over the 
Internet and mobile wireless connections (CRTC, CMR 2019, p. 144).
A recent Canadian Media Usage Study paints a similar picture, with time spent watching television 
weekly in Canada growing in the fifteen years once streaming services are included. As it observes, 
“all [o]ffline media have experienced declines in their ability to generate weekly reach over the last 14 
years. The TV medium is the exception” (p. 4). Another recent version of that report also observes 
that TV viewing has grown by nearly 200 minutes per week during the last decade-and-a-half, with 
almost all of that gain being attributable to the growth of streaming television services.
Data from Cisco and Sandvine also suggest that television and online video are driving the evolution 
of the Internet, with more than half of all down-stream Internet traffic now accounted for by Netflix 
and Youtube. For the past few years, Netflix alone has accounted for at least a third of all Internet 
traffic in North America (p. 4). Additionally, watching television over the Internet and via mobile 
devices has resulted in television viewing time remaining relatively constant over time. Internet 
traffic also ebbs and wanes over the course of a day in ways that match traditional television viewing 
patterns. Elsewhere, I have called this the rise of the prime time Internet.
Of course, this does not mean that life is easy in the television business. Indeed, all its constituent 
elements must come to terms with an environment that is becoming structurally more differentiated 
because of new media, notably IPTV and services such as Netflix that are made available over the 
Internet, and because of major changes in how people use the multiplying media at their disposal.
Incumbent television providers have leaned heavily on the CRTC and Parliament to change the rules 
to bring online video services into the broadcasting regulatory fold. The BTLR’s (2020) Canada’s 
Communications Future report released earlier this year proposes to do just this by creating a new 
category of “media content undertakings” to be brought under jurisdiction of CRTC-cum-super-
regulator, the Canadian Communications Commission and revamped Broadcasting Act (BTLR, 2020, 
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p. 123). New legislation (Bill C10) introduced while this report was being written seeks to accomplish 
some of those goals, even if not exactly as the BTLR report proposed. 
Others still, including the CBC, have pushed hard for a levy on Internet access and mobile wireless 
services in support of Canadian content, and to selectively lift data caps for Canadian content while 
applying them to “foreign” TV services and everything else that people do with the Internet and 
mobile phones. While strange bedfellows in the best of cases, the incumbent, vertically-integrated 
telecoms and TV service providers and reinvigorated cultural nationalists are rallying around the idea 
that keeping the BDU-centric TV model for as long as possible is a wise thing to do. Such sentiments 
informs the proposed amendments to the Broadcasting Act that are now under consideration (see 
Canada, 2020; BTLR, 2020; Bell, 2014, notably pp. 22-24; the Miller Report (2015) commissioned by 
the ACTRA, CMPA, Writers Guild of Canada, the Directors Guild of Canada, the Friends of Canadian 
Broadcasting and Unifor).
In sum, instead of cannibalizing the revenue of the television industry, developments in online video 
services and new modes of consumption using the Internet, IPTV and mobile wireless services have 
added greatly to the size and diversity of the AVMS marketplace. In fact, such activities are driving 
the uptake and use of mobile wireless services and underpin the Rogers, Telus, Shaw, Bell and 
Videotron’s business case for investments in next generation fibre-to-the-doorstep infrastructure. So, 
to paraphrase Mark Twain, rumours of television’s demise are greatly exaggerated.
Instead of cannibalizing the revenue of the 
television industry, developments in online 
video services and new modes of consumption 
using the Internet, IPTV and mobile wireless 
services have added greatly to the size and 
diversity of the AVMS marketplace. 
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Digital Audiovisual Media 
Services, App Stores and Internet 
Advertising: Growth, Upheaval 
and Transformation of the 
Network Media Economy in 
Canada
Anchor Findings
Digital audiovisual media services (AVMS)—online video, music, gaming and app stores—have grown 
swiftly and global actors like Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft and Netflix are now central 
figures on the media landscape in Canada.
After nearly a decade-and-a-half of decline the Canadian music industry the return to growth over the 
last five years has driven revenues well-beyond previous highs, buoyed by live music and online music 
services revenue.
Traditional newspaper revenue based on advertising continues its precipitous decline; daily newspa-
per revenue last year was less than half what it had been at its peak in 2006. Although online publi-
cations continue to grow in number, none come close to matching, let alone displacing, the role of 
declining traditional news outlets. 
Anch r Finding
 } Digital audiovisual media services (AVMS)—online video, music, gaming 
and app stores—have grown swiftly and global actors like Google, Amazon, 
F cebook, Appl , Microsoft nd Netflix are now central figures on the m -
dia landscape in Canada.
 } After nearly a decade-and-a-half of decline the Canadian music industry 
the return to growth over the last five years has driven revenues well-be-
yond previous highs, buoyed by live music and online music services reve-
nue.
 } Traditional newspaper revenue based on advertising continues its precip-
itous decline; daily newspaper revenue last year was less than half what it 
had been at its peak in 2006. Although online publications continue to grow 
in number, none come close to matching, let alone displacing, the role of 
declining traditional news outlets.
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Beginning last year, we made some fairly dramatic changes that were designed to capture a broader 
range of audiovisual media services that are delivered over the Internet and which include more than 
just online video subscription and download services and Internet advertising. We continue that effort 
this year. The additional segments that we cover include: 
1. Digital games: Online gaming, gaming applications, game downloads or in-game purchases
2. App stores, in particular Google Play and Apple’s App Store
3. Music downloads and streaming music subscriptions ic subscriptions18
It is crucial to expand our coverage and analysis in this way because total revenue for online video, 
music, gaming and app stores—i.e. digital audiovisual media services (AVMS)—has soared from 
$1.7 billion in 2014 to $5.6 billion last year. Of this amount, digital games together accounted for an 
impressive $1329.1 million in 2018 (the latest year for which data is available), up from $738.2 million 
in 2014. Beyond significant growth through Apple and Google’s app stores, downloads, subscription 
revenues from companies like Valve and Activision/Blizzard, Microsoft’s Xbox platform, Sony’s 
Playstation, and Nintendo are driving the increases we observe. As of 2019, we estimate that app 
store revenues were $979.1 million. So, too, with online subscription and download music services, 
whose revenues have grown by more than five-fold from an estimated $190.9 million in 2011 to 
$1042.7 million last year (a point we will flesh out further in the next section of this report). 
 
Add in Internet advertising of $8.8 billion last year (see further below), and these sectors constituted 
a $14.4 billion pillar of the network media economy, or 16% of all revenue. In sum, the fast-growing 
digital AVMS sectors have become a central pillar of the $91.3 billion network media economy in 





As of 2019, we estimate that app store revenues were $979.1 
million. So, too, with online subscription and download music 
services, whose revenues have grown by more than five-fold from 
an estimated $190.9 million in 2011 to $1042.7 million last year.
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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Internet Advertising Online Video-on-Demand Online Music
Digital Games Google Play App Store Apple App Store
Sources and Note: see “App Economy” sheet in the Excel Workbook. ** Top line figures for each category-
-e.g. Online Video Subscription & Downloads; Online Music Downloads or Streaming Music Subscriptions; 
and Digital games--exclude Google Play and Apple App Store revenues to avoid double counting.
The impact of the brisk pace of growth depicted in Figure 17 is also revealed by the fact that revenue 
for the digital AVMS sectors surpassed those of the traditional content media for the first time last 
year. Figure 25 below illustrates the point. 
Google’s dominant role in online advertising, 
where it has revenue of $4,412.3 million last year, 
is increasingly being complemented by its fast-
growing presence in app store sales.
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Traditional Audiovisual Media + Publishing Digital Audiovisual Media + Publishing
Source: see “App Economy” sheet in the Excel Workbook. 
The digital media industries have added 
substantially to the size, complexity and diversity 
of the network media environment. In so doing, 
they have also brought significant global actors 
such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, 
Netflix and Microsoft deeper into the media 
landscape in Canada (and other countries around 
the world) than ever before. Indeed, Google’s 
dominant role in online advertising, where it 
has revenue of $4,412.3 million last year, is 
increasingly being complemented by its fast-
growing presence in app store sales. We estimate 
the Google Play Store’s revenues to be $189.6 
million from digital games, $147.4 million from its 
online video services (i.e. Google Play, YouTube 
Premium and YouTube Subscription), and another 
$84.3 million from music apps and downloads. 
All told, Google had a total revenue of $4.8 billion 
in Canada last year, or just over 5% of all revenue 
across the network media economy, making it the 
fifth largest actor in Canada. 
While there is no doubt that the Internet giants 
have carved out a massively larger place within 
the network media economy in Canada a fairly 
short period of time, it is also crucial to keep 
perspective on things. On the one hand, we 
observe that the revenues of Google, Amazon, 
Facebook, Apple and Netflix have tripled in 
Canada in the last five years and, consequently, 
they have become major actors within the 
network media economy. At the same time, 
however, despite this extraordinary growth, 
in 2019, the “big five” global Internet giants’ 
combined share of the Canadian network media 
economy added up to just 10% of the total, while 
the “big five” Canadian firms—BCE, Rogers, Telus, 
Shaw and Quebecor—accounted for nearly three-
quarters of the total.   
It must also be borne in mind that while the 
digital platforms are becoming increasingly 
involved in the aggregation and distribution 
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of media and cultural content, they also offer 
independent audiovisual media service operators 
a tempting alternative to the BDU-driven 
approach to broadcasting policy in Canada 
that, as noted earlier, can foreclose access to 
potentially lucrative new revenue streams and 
distribution opportunities. Indeed, whereas fees 
for independent television services such as 
APTN, OUTtv, Blue Ant, etc. that are carried by 
the BDUs are measured in dimes, revenue from 
online video subscription-based and download 
services like Amazon and Apple are measured 
in dollars (that said, this simplifies things 
because the BDU carriage deals offer access to 
audiences of a set size for a longer period of time 
whereas the digital platforms do not). The digital 
platforms also offer far more insight into the 
services that they distribute, who their audiences 
are, easier and faster billing and revenue splitting 
arrangements, greater marketing opportunities, 
and so on. Lastly, the platforms also offer access 
to global audiences rather than just domestic 
ones. 
Indeed, for ambitious independent pay TV 
services in Canada, global growth rather than a 
continued fixation on domestic markets, is now 
the objective. Bell, Rogers, Shaw and Quebecor, 
in contrast, still seem to be intent on staking out 
their business model on the acquisition of foreign 
(mainly US) programming rights for distribution in 
Canada, rather than investing significantly in their 
own original programming that could then be 
distributed not just at home but around the world. 
That model’s days, however, are surely numbered 
as the big US and international actors go direct to 
audiences with their own services. 
Remaking the Music Industry: From Ruin to 
Recovery
The music industry is, perhaps, the best example of the wrenching and protracted changes that 
traditional media industries have undergone before returning to significant new patterns of growth 
and development over the last five years or so. Indeed, while many have held up the music industry 
for the last two decades as a poster child for the woes besetting “traditional media” at the hands of 
digital media, rampant piracy and so forth, the music industry in Canada actually stands as a sobering 
counterpoint to such claims. Indeed, the music industry is not in crisis. The picture to be sure, is 
mixed but has steadily improved for the last five years to the point that it is probably now safe to say 
that it is in good shape. 
The analysis that follows is also instructive in relation to the kinds of claims that, for example, 
Jonathan Taplin makes in Move Fast and Break Things, and those that we find in Public Policy 
Forum’s The Shattered Mirror report, Richard Stursberg’s The Tangled Garden or any number of other 
think tank and advocacy group reports that seem to gather an excessive share of people and policy 
makers’ attention. Each is a case study in how the selective use of data for one specific aspect of 
a media sector is misleadingly held out to stand for the whole when it does not. Taplin’s repeated 
references to the steep drop in revenue for “recorded music” is of this type. Why that is so misleading 
will become evident in the discussion of the music industries in Canada that follows immediately 
below. 
53
Indeed, like Taplin, many observers have argued for close to two decades that the music industry 
has been in crisis. This began with the notoriety of file-sharing and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks from 
Napster in the late-1990s, to Grokster, Pirate Bay and the closing of Limewire in the first decade of the 
21st Century, each phase of which reinforced the view of an industry under siege, and that this would 
only get worse as broadband Internet became more widely used and search engine giants like Google 
allegedly built their businesses on top of linking to other people’s content without permission or fair 
payments. For two decades, the Recording Industry Association of America and the International 
Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI)—two international trade associations that represent the 
music industries—consistently argued that the industry’s revenues were in decline and that the music 
business is the ‘canary in the coalshaft’ for things to come for the rest of the media.  
And like Taplin, the evidence with respect to the deep and long-term plunge in “recorded music” 
revenue is clear cut and convincing, as Figure 26 below depicts. 
Figure 26: The Collapse of the Recorded Music Industry in Canada, 1998-2019 











Source: Statistics Canada, Sound Recording and Music Publishing, Summary Statistics CANSIM TABLE 
361-0005. 
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This image of a beleaguered industry, however, is misleading. This is because it refers only to the 
“recorded music” segment of the industry and lets that stand for the whole. Figure 27 below, however, 
tells a different story once the three other main segments of the music industry are brought into the 
picture: (1) concerts and live performances, (2) music downloaded or streamed on the Internet and 
mobile devices, and (3) publishing (lending rights + more digital and network distribution platforms). 







Recorded Music Internet, Mobile Devices Streaming Publishing Concerts/Live
Sources: Recorded Music from Statistics Canada, Sound Recording and Music Publishing, Summary 
Statistics CANSIM TABLE 361-0005; Sound Recording: data tables, October 2005, catalogue no. 
87F0008XIE; Sound Recording and Music Publishing, Cat. 87F0008X; Publishing from Socan, Financial 
Report (various years); Concerts and Internet from PriceWaterhouseCooper, Global Media and 
Entertainment Outlook (various years); USD converted to CDN$ using Bank of Canada Year Average of 
Exchange Rates. See the “Music” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
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To be sure, from some angles, this is not 
entirely a “good news” story. “Recorded music” 
has gone into seemingly terminal decline. In 
addition, the sum of all revenues from the main 
elements of the music industry – i.e. recorded 
music, digital sales, concerts and publishing 
royalties – indicates that the music industry 
revenues declined from $1,889.7 million in 1998 
to $1,578.9 in 2011, so there was a decade-long 
plus period when the the music industry as a 
whole suffered set-backs. However, since 2014 
or so, revenues have rebounded and by last year 
they were higher than they had ever been at 
$2,514.6 million. 
Recognizing that the music industry had clearly 
turned a corner, Socan, the trade association 
that represents music composers, writers 
and publishers in Canada, has boasted of “a 
banner year” and “record revenue” for the last 
half decade (Socan, 2015, pp. 1 & 8). In 2016, 
it claimed that it “record revenue” of $330 
million, with the amount of money distributed to 
musicians and publishers up nearly five percent, 
international royalties up by nearly a third over 
the previous three years and Internet-related 
revenue more than doubling in that year (Socan, 
2016 Annual Report, p. 5). 2017 was the year 
of “financial greatest hits”, the organization 
once again gloated (Socan, 2018, p. 2). The 
beat goes on, with “another impressive year in 
2018 as the organization continues to break 
records for licensing revenue and distributions 
to our members” (Socan, 2019, p. 2). Revenue 
hit $405.6 million last year, and this is after 
deducting a one-off impairment charge of $42 
million from the total. Once again, this brisk pace 
of growth has been propelled by a 38% increase 
in royalties from online services alone (Socan, 
2020). 
The turn-around in the state of the music 
industries has also been chronicled at the 
international level. Thus, as the IFPI stated in its 
2013 Digital Music Report, “the music industry 
achieved its best year-on-year performance 
since 1998” (p. 5). In 2014, the same publication 
observed, “Recorded music revenues in most 
major markets have returned to growth” (p. 5). 
The IFPI struck a more measured note last year 
but was still upbeat, the upshot of which is that 
the lingering sense of an industry is in crisis is 
slipping into the past:
. . . After two decades of almost 
uninterrupted decline, 2015 witnessed key 
milestones for recorded music: measurable 
revenue growth globally; consumption of 
music exploding everywhere; and digital 
revenues overtaking income from physical 
formats for the first time. These are positive 
metrics of accomplishment. They reflect an 
industry that has adapted to the digital age 
and emerged stronger and smarter (IFPI, 
2016, p. 5). 
A common thread in each of these sources is 
that, because the music industries embraced 
digital/Internet sources of revenue earlier than 
other media, their fortunes have turned around 
more quickly. Already by 2012, the industry was 
obtaining about 15% of its revenues from online, 
mobile and digital sources compared to the 
single digit figures for newspapers and television 
that still prevail today. In other words, after having 
suffered the blows from the onslaught of the 
Internet and piracy early in the game, the music 
industry was out in front of others in embracing 
the realities of an ever-increasing Internet- and 
mobile-centric media world. These lessons may 
hold for other media as well.
The upshot is that after having gone through 
wrenching changes, the music industry has been 
recomposed along new lines. First and foremost, 
such lessons should be instructive for those 
currently wringing their hands over the ‘death of 
television’. 
To illustrate the points further, Figure 28 below 
depicts the proportionate size of the music 
industries over the last two decades and its 
fundamental transformation away from one 
centred on recorded music to one where 
concerts, online music services, as well as 
publishing royalties play pivotal and growing 
roles.    
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Figure 28: The Structural Transformation of the Music Industries in Canada, 2000, 








Recorded Music Concerts/Live Publishing Internet Streaming & Downloads
Sources: Recorded Music from Statistics Canada, Sound Recording and Music Publishing, Summary 
Statistics CANSIM TABLE 361-0005; Sound Recording: data tables, October 2005, catalogue no. 
87F0008XIE; Sound Recording and Music Publishing, Cat. 87F0008X; Publishing from Socan, Financial 
Report (various years); Concerts and Internet from PriceWaterhouseCooper, Global Media and 
Entertainment Outlook (various years); USD converted to CDN$ using Bank of Canada Year Average of 
Exchange Rates. See the “Music” sheet in the Excel Workbook.
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Newspapers and Magazine Publishers in Peril
Perhaps the most dramatic tale of doom and gloom in the media economy comes from the 
experience of newspapers and magazines. While the crisis of journalism that could be clearly seen 
in the US and European countries by the late 2000s took longer to become as full blown in Canada, 
that lag has now vanished. While circulation has been in decline for decades, newspaper revenue had 
continued to grow until peaking between 2006 and 2008 at around $4.8 billion. Since then, however, 
it has plunged; by last year, newspaper revenue was less than half of what it had been a little over a 
decade earlier, as Figure 29 below depicts.












2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2019
Daily Newspaper Adv$ Daily Newspaper Circ$
Online $ Total Community Newspaper $
Sources: See the “Newspaper” sheet in the Excel Workbookfor industry revenues back to 1984. 
Newspaper Canada from 2000 onwards; Statistics Canada before. 
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Magazines stand in a similar position to newspapers. Similar to the press, magazine revenue also 
peaked in 2008 at $2.4 billion. Fast forward to 2019, and revenue has plunged to less than half of that 
level, i.e. $1.1 million. In short, the two media that basically pioneered commercial advertising, and 
which have depended extensively on it ever since—many critics would argue, excessively so— are now 
in a state of economic free-fall, with no end in sight (see the “Magazine” sheet in the Excel Workbook).
Newspaper publishers have tried to stanch the hemorrhaging business losses by erecting paywalls 
in order to obtain a new line of revenue. The extent of this effort can be grasped by noting that, prior 
to 2011, there were no significant daily newspapers with paywalls in Canada. That changed swiftly, 
however. By 2013, 27 dailies accounting for roughly 45% of daily circulation were behind paywalls. By 
2015, the number had grown to 38 dailies, a number that still stood last year. Indeed, paywalls were 
erected so fast and extensively between 2011 and 2015 in Canada that they were more prominent in 
this country than in either the US or the UK (see here). 
 









2011 2012 2013 2015 2018
Sources and Notes: Newspaper Canada 2015 Daily Circulation Report and observations. 
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While paywalls have been part of newspaper publishers’ strategy of increasing digital revenues, 
the revenue gained has not come anywhere close to matching what has been lost. While online 
revenue has grown from next to nothing fifteen years ago to $220 million last year, this gain pales in 
comparison to the roughly $2.7 billion in lost revenue that has occurred since 2018. Moreover, online 
revenue has actually been declining for the last few years.
 
The fact that tough times continue can also be seen in the fact that since 2008 the number of daily 
newspapers has dropped from 139 to 75 (News Media Canada, 2020, p. 10). In fact, even this latter 
figure masks the fact that the industry itself has so fudged the definition of what a “daily newspaper” 
is over the past several years that it is no longer possible to compare such figures today with what 
they once referred to not-so-long ago. 
The punishing effects of these trends in the publishing sectors are clear, with some of the more 
illustrative highlights from the past few years listed below:19
• 
• In November 2018, Postmedia pared back its publishing schedule by one day per week at eleven 
local newspapers: the Kingston Whig-Standard, Belleville Intelligencer, The Brockville Recorder 
and Times, Chatham Daily News, Cornwall Standard Freeholder, Owen Sound Sun Times, Sarnia 
Observer, Stratford Beacon Herald, Woodstock Sentinel-Review, St. Thomas Times-Journal 
and Simcoe Reformer. This followed the closure of six other small town papers in June and 
publishing schedules cut at four others (J-Source; Canadian Press)
• In November 2017, Torstar and Postmedia swap 41 newspapers, mostly community papers, the 
vast majority of which (i.e. 37) were immediately shut down and 290 employees set to be laid 
off. The companies’ paper swap effectively divided Ontario into two zones of mutual exclusivity, 
or local monopolies—all of which begot an inquiry into potential collusion and anti-competitive 
behaviour by the Competition Bureau (2018) (also see Jackson, 2018). 
• Postmedia’s Vancouver Sun and The Province cut twenty-six and thirty-three jobs being cut in 
2017 while reduced publishing schedules adopted across Postmedia chain beginning in 2012 
have been kept in place (the Calgary Herald, Edmonton Journal and Ottawa Citizen) and previous 
years (e.g. the National Post);
• Torstar cut 220 positions in 2016 and eighteen positions cut at the Globe and Mail in 2014 (i.e. 
nine editorial, three photographers, three copy-editors and three others, bringing the number 
of lay-offs to 100 since 2012). Voluntary retirement programs for journalists and editorial staff 
have been a steady feature at the paper ever since (here and here);
• Postmedia cuts 90-plus jobs in Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton and Ottawa in 2016, with 
expectations that 50 more people would take voluntary lay-offs and a standing offer of buyouts 
and early retirement packages kept in place.






• Smaller papers not exempt from such processes, either with twenty lay-offs at the Halifax 
Chronicle-Herald in 2014 and staff at the paper on strike for much of 2015 and 2016; lay-
offs of nine editorial and photographic staff across the Brunswick News chain in the Maritime 
provinces; and six French papers in Quebec (Le Soleil, Le Nouvelliste, Le Quotidien, La Tribune, 
La Voix de l’Est, Le Devoir) were sold by Gesca/LaPresse to Group Capitales Médias in March 
2015;
• even after some of the newly emerging journalistic organizations such iPolitics began to bulk 
up in the mid-2010s, they only had 15 full time journalists, five staff and a number of free-
lancers, for example, as of 2015. Even that, however, did not secure a future for iPolitics as an 
independent news organization since it was acquired by Torstar in 2018. 
A regularly updated tally of newspaper and broadcasting stations that have been closed, opened, or 
decided to either pare back or expand their publishing schedules, as well as journalism jobs gained 
and lost, can be found at the Local News Research Project created and maintained by researchers at 
Ryerson University, UBC and Royal Roads University (see Lindgren, Corbett, Hodson & Ritter, 2020). 
The impact of the “crisis of journalism” can also be seen in the number of full-time journalist jobs 
lost over time. Statistics Canada’s data on the number of full-time journalists employed over the past 
three decades is probably the most complete and comprehensive source on the subject. Whereas 
lobby groups, think tanks and others have pointed to the loss of 10-15,000 journalism jobs over the 
course of the decade as they paint a dire portrait of a vocation vital to democracy that is allegedly 
being wiped out by the likes of Google and Facebook, Statistics Canada data allows for a much more 
nuanced and complex view than that, albeit by no means one that lets us look through the world with 
rose-tinted glasses and to be complacent. 
The headline based on Statistics Canada’s Labour Force Survey data is that the number of full-time 
journalists in Canada has fallen from 13,000 to 9,100 since 2013—a drop of 30%. This is a big loss, 
to be sure, but it is much less than figures that are three- to four times that high that are endlessly 
circulated by lobby groups and think tanks like the Friends of Canadian Broadcasting, Public Policy 
Forum, News Media Canada and regularly regurgitated by journalists, all of whom know that the 
Statistics Canada data exists but refuse to acknowledge its existence. It is also important to note 
that, prior to 2013, the number of full-time working journalists working in Canada had stumbled 
upwards over the past three-and-a-half decades, growing by roughly fifty percent to 12,400 full-time 
journalists at the end of the 1990s, before inching upwards after that until reaching its peak in 2013, 
after which a wave of cuts over the last six years culled the ranks of professional full-time journalists 
in Canada by nearly a third. 
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Figure 31 below illustrates the twists and turns that have defined the uneasy fate of journalists in 
Canada for the last three-and-a-half decades.









Total Employed in Advertising, Marketing & PR Total Full Time Employed Journalists
Sources: Statistics Canada (2019) Employment by occupation: 1123 Professional occupations in 
advertising, marketing and public relations and Statistics Canada (2016). Employment in Journalism 
occupation, by province. Custom LFS tabulation. File on record with author.
The circumstances look even more grave once 
we consider that the modest increases that have 
taken over time did so against a media economy 
that has quadrupled in size as well as increases 
in the size of the economy and the general 
population. Moreover, as Sabrina Wilkinson 
observes, not only are the number of journalism 
jobs in decline, amongst those that do remain, 
fewer are permanent and much less job security 
is now the new normal (Wilkinson, 2019). Also 
consider the grim fact that even the modest 
growth in the number of journalists that did occur 
over the past three decades has been vastly 
outpaced by the growth of the PR, advertising and 
marketing professions. In 1987, there were four 
people working in the publicity business for every 
journalist; last year, the imbalance had ballooned 
to an astonishing 15:1. 
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Of course, several new commercial and philanthropic supported, Internet-based approaches to 
journalism and public commentary have also emerged over the past twenty years.20 That many of 
these ventures have been launched by professional journalists is to their credit and is the fact that 
some of them have broken important news stories. Canadaland, in particular, is in this league on this 
score and has had added a vibrant and credible new source of news, information, media criticism 
and opinion to the otherwise insular media and journalistic culture in Canada. Others have offered 
specialized expertise in specific areas, such as iPolitics, Policy Options and the Hill Times’ suite of 
publications (e.g. The Wire Report). Academics-as-public intellectuals have also been brought back 
into the conversation in ways that are refreshing and that have added expertise and diversity to 
journalism and the public sphere. The revival of the partisan press, while unfortunately also fuelling 
vitriol and extreme political voices, can also offer new voices that enliven democracy by engaging 
people to be more actively involved in it. 
 
ANALYSIS - Some Reflections on Journalism, 
Public Subsidies and Public Goods
Early on, the intersection between journalism and the Internet led some—including me—to be 
hopeful that we were seeing the emergence of vibrant “network free press” that would help to shake 
democracy out of its long-term stupor (Benkler, 2009). Such hopeful optimism has not come to pass. 
The crisis of journalism is real and the number of professional journalism jobs lost a real problem 
as well. Hopeful journalism start-ups run by professional journalists have been re-absorbed into the 
fold, for example, with Torstar’s acquisition of iPolitics two years ago. That acquisition also revealed 
that it is not only important to have seasoned journalists backing new digital journalism ventures 
but also wealthy patrons, given the role of the Molson family in bankrolling iPolitics from start-up to 
acquisition. 
Crucially, none of these newer online outlets even ranks amongst the top 60 Internet news sources 
that people in Canada turn to. However, Canadians do use the Internet and social media quite 
extensively as “pathways to the news” (Reuters Institute, 2019). Furthermore, the range of Internet 
news sources that they consult when doing so is quite broad and diverse, consisting as it does of 
a mixture of new and old, as well as local, national and international news sources (a point we will 
return to in our next report). Even with the far greater diversity of online news sources available to 
Canadians, traditional news organizations are still amongst the most important sources of journalism 
that they consult (see the “Internet News Sources” sheet in the Excel Workbook, based on Comscore 
(2020) Media Metrix Multi-Platform Canada, News/Information Category, Sept 2019 – Sept 2020). 
A key reason for mounting skepticism is that the central problem that has affected journalism 




the people have never paid the full cost for the news. For the past 150 years, advertising played an 
ever-increasing role in covering up that reality, but that façade is now collapsing before our eyes (John 
& Loeb-Silberstein, 2016; Pickard, 2019). As the Reuters Institute’s latest Digital News Report (2020) 
states, only 13% of Canadians are willing to pay for the new online (p. 90). 
Given this unwillingness to pay for the news—historically and today—once the advertising subsidy 
that has been journalism’s main source of funding for the last century dries up, or is diverted to the 
Internet and into the pockets of Google and Facebook, who or what will fill the breach?
The major English- and French-language press groups have repeatedly called for subsidies in 
response to these conditions, and, unsurprisingly, that they in particular should be the beneficiaries.21 
The press group’s trade association, News Media Canada, ramped up its newest “Levelling the Playing 
Field” as this report was being prepared—with yet another report to flood the marketplace of ideas 
and public policy debates. 
The Liberal Government responded to these calls in its 2019 Budget by announcing a journalism 
support program organized around the following three measures and worth $595 million over five 
years:
 } A new refundable tax credit for journalism organizations.
 } A new non-refundable tax credit for subscriptions to Canadian digital news.
 } Access to charitable tax incentives for not-for-profit journalism (also see here).
 
Of course, the idea of public policy supports and public subsidies for journalism has been resisted in 
many quarters, not least by many of the new journalistic ventures that have emerged in recent years 
and which are still trying to become commercially viable (see, for example, Canadaland’s position 
statement on the issue). The view from those opposed to public policy interventions of any kind along 
these lines tends to be four-fold: 
1. First, taking subsidies from government will turn journalist watchdogs into politicians’ lapdogs, 
and be at odds with the liberal theory of the free press; 
2. subsidies will be used to preserve “legacy media” like broadcasters and newspapers that are 
better left to die;
3. or worse, funds will be funneled to commercial enterprises and the CBC—both of which are 
exactly the incumbent players that new upstarts must compete against tooth-and-nail as they 
seek to carve out a place for themselves in the media world; 
4. crowd-funding, subscriptions or some other type of direct payments by consumers will do the 




Yet, the idea that paywalls, crowdfunding, subscriptions, backing by wealthy philanthropists, or some 
combination thereof might carry the day brings us right back to square one, however: people have 
never paid the full-freight for journalism. This is true today, and it is true historically (John, 1998; Pick-
ard, 2019). From a historical point of view, and within the context of liberal capitalist democracies, 
there has always been some combination of three types of subsidies that have kept the “free press” 
afloat: 
1. Advertising, which came unto its own between the 1880s and 1920s in North America and 
Europe as the main source of income for the press (Baldasty, 1992; Pickard, 2019; Sotiron, 
2005). 
2. Public funds provided by democratic governments, perhaps most innovatively and expansively 
beginning with the 1792 Postal Act in the US that used the development of a universal 
postal system to (a) bring “general intelligence to every man’s [sic] doorstep” and, even more 
audaciously, (b) as the foundation of a nation-wide news exchange system that allowed 
newspapers and magazine publishers to exchange a copy of their publications with other 
publishers across the country as often as they liked for free in order to promote the nation-wide, 
social circulation of the news and to promote the development of the press throughout the US. 
The use of public funds to create public service broadcasters throughout western democracies 
from the 1920s and 1930s onwards to the present day is a more familiar version of the use of 
public subsidies to support the development and economic viability of journalism in the public 
interest (John, 1998; John, 2011; John & Silberstein-Loeb, 2015). 
3. Wealthy patrons who have funded journalism to pursue political, ideological and philanthropic 
goals, notably in Canada by Conrad Black who started the National Post in 1998 and which was 
kept afloat for more than a decade by new owners, not as a profitable, business venture, or for 
the love of journalism as a craft, so much as a way to re-invigorate the conservative political 
movement and culture in Canada.  
The question, thus, is not whether journalism will be, at least in part, subsidized but what kind of 
subsidies will be enrolled in the task of supporting public interest journalism fit for a democracy 
and promoting the functions that we think are essential to the well-being of ourselves, society and 
democracy?
Avoiding, or simply opposing, subsidies on the ground that they are antithetical to “market values” 
ignores the reality that paywalls, and the entire edifice of intellectual property upon which they 
are based, is a specially devised creature of “the state” designed to deal with the public good 
characteristics of news, knowledge, ideas and culture to begin with. Indeed, the whole institutional 
set-up of copyright is based on a basic predicate: these goods are not normal commodities traded in 
normal markets. That is why distinct “intellectual property laws” have been created for them, unlike 
most other kinds of “property” where the standard laws that govern property and market relations 
hold sway.
In a bid to encourage the production and consumption of news, copyright was not extended to news 
until after the turn-of-the-20th Century. Indeed, news itself wasn’t even copyrightable– i.e. treated as 
quasi-property—in the eyes of the law – in the UK until this time. Similar events took place in the US 
in 1918 (Tworek, 2015). As a matter of fact, subsidies and legal protections like copyright have been 
the twin pillars of journalism in liberal capitalist democracies for the last century, and both measures 
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have been crucial to furthering the free press and free speech values that it embodies and that 
democracy needs to flourish (see John on how the US post service subsidized the development of the 
“free press” to the tune of tens of billions of dollars per annum in the late-18th and 19th centuries).
Once again, it’s worth noting that people have never paid the full freight for a wide variety of media 
and cultural productions. These go beyond audiovisual media to include libraries, education, basic 
research, archives, the arts, orchestras, statistical agencies, universities, etc., in sum, the media, 
culture and knowledge infrastructures of modern capitalist societies. As a general rule, the more of 
these things there are, and the better they are cared for in the public interest, the healthier, happier 
and more democratic a society is.
Information/culture/media goods are not public goods just because I say they are but because 
society does through the political process, and because they fit the criteria for public goods set out 
in mainstream and heterodox economic theory, historical experience, as well as normative ideas that 
directly link them to human development, citizenship and democracy. The economic ways and means 
used to produce such things through a combination of market and non-market forces are integral 
parts of the overall structure of the media economy not just in Canada but around the world—at 
least developed and democratic ones. The settlement struck during the ‘industrial media era’ that 
recognized these basic facts is coming undone, but without clear alternatives in sight.
Turning away from such realities for reasons of self-interest is understandable but avoids the nub of 
the issues before us. How to settle the problems raised by these issues is an open question. However, 
railing against the idea of press subsidies as if they are an aberration and endemically at odds with 
the liberal free press tradition is just wrong. 
Once this is understood, then we can have a reasoned debate about what the Liberal Government’s 
journalism support measures do and do not do well. We can also face up to the reality that even 
if Google and Facebook are properly brought to heel through regulatory measures that curb their 
dominance of the online ad-tech system as well as the unlimited harvesting and exploitation of 
personal, social and environmental data that defines their business models—and surveillance 
capitalism, more broadly, as Shoshana Zuboff (2018) refers to the kind of society their practices 
anticipate, advertising is not the core of the media economy. We can also face up to the reality that 
even when advertising was more central to the commercial media model, this was not some kind of 
golden age but came with its own compromises and constraints that always rubbed uneasily with 
both people’s needs and the needs of democracy. 
People have never paid the full freight for a wide variety of 
media and cultural productions. These go beyond audiovisual 
media to include libraries, education, basic research, archives, 
the arts, orchestras, statistical agencies, universities, etc., 




on the Political Economy and 
Power of Communication and 
Culture Policy
This report has examined the development of the network media ecology over the past three-and-a-
half decades. It has done so out of the conviction that too often discussion of “the media” proceeds 
without a consistent and solid, informative base of evidence, or even a coherent definition of what is 
to be studied. Consequently, too often the policy discussions and public debates that ensue are driven 
by actors whose interests and objectives are understandable but not necessarily in line with public 
interests.
The analysis that this report offers has proceeded step-by-step to examine each of the nineteen 
sectors of the telecoms, audiovisual media and online services and applications that comprise 
the network media economy. In so doing, it has revealed which sectors have floundered while also 
highlighting those that have flourished. 
With respect to the former, it has identified four media sectors whose business models depend 
primarily on advertising that are in crisis, e.g. broadcast television, radio, newspapers and magazines. 
Collectively, over the last decade, these media sectors have lost $4.9 billion in revenue; eight 
broadcast television stations have gone dark; numerous daily newspapers have either been closed 
or pared back their publishing schedules and nearly 4,000 full-time journalist jobs have been cut 
since 2013. For these media sectors, and the critically important functions that they support—namely 
professional and local journalism—these are dark days indeed. 
The problem, thus, is not that there is no “crisis of the media”. For some media, there is. However, as 
this report emphasizes, to the extent that there is a crisis, it applies to those media whose business 
models depend primarily on advertising, where advertising spending has been in decline in “real 
dollar” terms on a per capita basis and in relation to the size of the media economy and to gross 
domestic income for most of the past decade. This is one key cornerstone of the problems at hand 
and will need to be dealt with as such.
While the overall envelope of advertising has remained stubbornly fixed (or even falling on some 
measures), online advertising soared to $8.8 billion last year and now accounts for over half of all 
advertising spending (e.g. 56%) in Canada and just under ten percent of the value of the network 
media economy. Simultaneously, Google and Facebook’s combined share of online advertising is also 
consolidating rapidly and reached 80.2% last year. This combination of protracted downward pressure 
on advertising spending within the economy, the shift to online advertising, and ongoing consolidation 
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of digital advertising has sharpened the conflict between Google and Facebook, on the one hand 
versus other, established media enterprises that still rely on advertising, on the other, and it is the 
latter that are clearly losing the battle.
Policy proposals by many media companies, trade associations, cultural policy advocacy groups 
and trade unions to expand changes to the income tax laws adopted in the 1970s that encouraged 
advertisers to advertise with Canadian broadcasters, newspapers and magazines rather than U.S. 
media to include online advertising are unlikely to be effective. This is because doing so will do 
nothing to address the relative decline of advertising. It also does not address the huge economies 
of scale that are driving the consolidation of online advertising, and which put local, regional and 
national media at a huge structural disadvantage when it comes to competing with the global Internet 
giants for advertising dollars (Hindman, 2018). It also leaves totally unscathed the other key drivers 
behind Google and Facebook’s rapid consolidation of Internet advertising: vertical integration over the 
former’s own digital ad exchange, control over the currency and audience measurement tools upon 
which such exchanges work, and the lax data and privacy protection rules upon which their business 
models are built. These should be the targets of a new generation of Internet regulation, and applied 
across the board to every player in the communications, Internet and media ecosystem, instead of the 
current approach that seems primarily to be about shaking down the international Internet giants for 
contributions to a narrow conception of communication and Canadian content. 
Conversely, perhaps the biggest critique of the assertion that the digital giants have precipitated a 
crisis of the media is that, in fact, most media industries in Canada are vibrant and even thriving. As 
this report has shown, what we call the “pay-per media” (e.g. mobile phones, Internet access, cable 
television, pay TV, online-video, music and gaming subscription and download services and app 
stores such as Google Play and Apple’s App Store) are thriving, even if pay and specialty services 
have seen their growth begin to unwind in the past three years. In fact, these sectors have grown so 
extensively over both the long-run and the mid- to short-term, that the “pay-per media” now constitute 
the core of the network media economy, with total revenues that outstripped those of advertising-
based media by a ratio of more than 5:1 last year. 
The rapid growth of online advertising and digital audiovisual media services has seen major global 
actors like Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft (the so-called GAFAM group of Internet 
giants) as well as Netflix move more deeply into the media landscape in Canada (and other countries) 
than ever before. In fact, combined, these entities had total revenue in Canada of $9.2 billion last year. 
As a result, communication and media companies within Canada are facing intensifying competition 
with these global Internet giants in AVMS services more than ever. 
That said, however, it is essential not to exaggerate the influence of the GAFAM group of digital 
platforms and Netflix. To help keep things in perspective, it is crucial to keep front-and-centre in mind 
that their combined market share now adds up to 10% of all revenue for the network media economy. 
By contrast, the “big four” vertically-integrated communication and media conglomerates in Canada 
(Bell, Rogers, Shaw, and Quebecor) accounted for a combined 56.4% of all revenue. Bring Canada’s 
third largest communications company, Telus ( which is not vertically-integrated), Telus, into the fold, 
and the “big 5” Canadian players dominate nearly three-quarters of all revenue for the network media 
economy. 
In other words, while there is no doubt that the GAFAM group of Internet giants and Netflix have 
become significant players in the media economy, their clout is more constrained than commonly 
assumed. The crisis narrative that is so widespread in certain circles obscures this reality, 
intentionally so it seems, because it helps to further policy measures intent on preserving incumbent 
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interests as well as peculiar and anachronistic view of the “Canadian Communication System”: 
one that is insular and dominated by the industry’s biggest players, a handful of think tanks and 
consultants, and policy insiders, and where questions about power and dominance are “off-limits”. 
This, however, should not be taken for a moment to mean that nothing should be done about Google 
and Facebook’s dominance of the online advertising market. In addition, attention and effort need to 
be directed at addressing, more generally, the broader tendency of the Internet giants to supplant the 
open, common protocols upon which the Internet has been built and designed for several decades 
with their own proprietary technical protocols; the lax privacy and data protection rules that have 
buttressed their market power; the take-it-or-leave stance that these actors impose on their users; 
their potential influence on elections and reluctance to open their “black box algorithms” to regulators; 
all of which are indicators of their clout, and the need to limit the potential harms that could flow from 
their unchecked power. 
In this regard, there is much to be done and absolutely no reason to shy away from the task. That, 
however, will entail abandoning ideological shibboleths in order to get a better handle on what a 
new generation of Internet, communication and media regulation should look like. The choice is not 
whether there will be such regulation but whether or not it will serve public interests, promote free 
expression, and further the values of a democracy.
That being said, the critique of digital dominance must extend in proper proportion to which it exists 
across the network media economy. In this regard, Bell, Shaw (Corus), Rogers, Telus and Quebecor 
(Videotron) are still the biggest players in Canada, by far, and this must be acknowledged and 
dealt with accordingly. The fact that all the major commercial TV operators in Canada are owned 
by telecoms companies sets us apart from the vast-majority of countries in the world. This is not 
something to wave away, but rather to be dealt with as one of the most significant root causes of 
serious constraints on communication and culture in Canada—a point that we will document and 
address in greater detail in our next report. Indeed, handing over the defining pillars of the AVMS 
sectors to a handful of mobile phone/Internet access/BDU companies has foreclosed potential 
new business models and lines of revenue, such as retransmission fees, greater online advertising 
revenue and new distribution opportunities via the Internet as well as from the global subscriber-
based video-on-demand services, as this report has shown. 
Such realities prevail over-and-above the fact that the mobile wireless market continues to be 
underdeveloped by international standards, given the high price of service, extraordinarily low levels 
of adoption and mobile data usage levels that are half the OECD average, even after accounting for 
some improvements in recent years.  These constraints should be seen not just at the limitations 
of uncompetitive and unresponsive mobile wireless markets but as constraints on how Canadians 
communicate with one another, use the media at their disposal and culture broadly construed. 
Instead, the tendency in mainstream policy circles is to wave away such realities as matters of 
narrow technical and commercial interest, almost philistine considerations—a stance struck by the 
Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review Panel’s preliminary report in its first few 
pages, for instance, before it turns to what it seems to think is the real crux of its remit: a narrow 
view of Canadian Culture drawn straight from the 1970s other than references to a supposedly more 
contemporary set of existential threats to the Internet now grounded in the Internet and a handful of 
American Internet giants. It also reveals itself in the words of far too many who think that, beyond 
“content”, everything else is housekeeping, as if questions about how people use the Internet and 
mobile phones to communicate with one another and to access so much else in the world, including a 
wide range of domestic and international media services, are for philistines. 
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The CRTC’s Harnessing the Future report from 2018 strikes such notes. Rather than trying to 
harness communication, culture and media to the realities of the Internet and “the digital age”, the 
broadcasting system is retained as the centre of the universe around which all else must be rotate, as 
if the myriad economic, social and personally expressive uses of the Internet and mobile phones are 
somehow both the proximate beneficiaries of the “broadcasting system” and subordinate to it. 
A raft of familiar voices from industry, “cultural policy” advocacy groups and think tanks incessantly 
sing a similar tune. While strange bedfellows in many other ways, these groups form a choir as they 
harken back to policy tools created in the 1970s to serve as the touchstones for what needs to be 
done today: e.g. exceptions to the Income Tax Act that privileged advertising spending in Canadian 
media over foreign media outlets, a levy on broadcast distribution undertakings to foster Canadian 
content, and a view of the “Canadian Broadcasting System” as if it is and should be an integrated 
whole. In this view, that the telcos own all the biggest commercial TV services in the country passes 
by without comment. That the high price of connectivity, data and restrictive data caps are not seen 
as artificial constraints on people’s ability to communicate and do as they please with the connectivity 
(the bandwidth) at their disposal, but rather something that such realities should be harnessed to 
support the broadcasting system is taken as a given. 
In fact, the BDU-centric model of TV seems to suit these groups just fine. To the extent that the 
Internet and mobile phones are given any thought at all, they are seen primarily as new delivery 
systems for broadcasting, a new revenue stream, and a means by which income can be diverted 
to support Canadian content. What could be easier, the “creator communities” say, than to apply 
a “small levy” on smart phones and Internet services to replenish the media production support 
funds that currently exist and apply them across an even wider variety of media, from TV, to music, 
to videogames, film, and so on today? And why not “zero-rate” Canadian Content while applying 
data caps to foreign content and everything else people do with their mobile phones and Internet 
connections, if that tilts the field in Canadian content producers’ favour? 
While these options were spurned by the last Liberal Government (and the previous Conservative 
ones before it), the current Liberal government seems more inclined to accept such views, even if not 
whole cloth. The BTLR report’s warm reception by the Heritage Minister and the proposed changes 
to the Broadcasting Act that were announced as this report was being finalized and which will 
bring online video services under the act and the jurisdiction of the CRTC are indicators of this new 
dispensation. It is not the online video services should not be regulated at all but rather the framing of 
them as if they are simply an appendage of the broadcasting system that is problematic.  
Further analysis and discussion of proposals now on the table will have to wait until next year’s report 
when they may be resolve (or not, given how long such things take). The point for here, however, is 
to draw attention to the way potential options for a new generation of Internet regulation and cultural 
policy are being framed by the kinds of faulty analysis, data and analogies highlighted in this report. 
That the current battle is as intense as it is, highlights the scale of the interests at stake. Sorting 
through these competing interests without losing sight of the multitude of public voices who have 
something to say, rather than just those who have long colonized communication and culture policy 
in this country and wrapped their own private interests in the flag, is vital. It is also critically important 
to have a long-term, systematic body of evidence, set against a background of history, a realistic 
appraisal of politics and power, experience as well as scholarly independence that can be brought to 
bear on these issues. That is what this report, and the CMCR Project, aims to achieve. We hope that 
you find it helpful.  n
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Appendix 1: The Rise of the Great Paywalls of Canadian Newspapers, 2011-2018
Newspaper Language Paywall Owner Weekly Total Daily Avg.
Whithorse Star English 2004 Independent 8,992.5 1,799 
Times Colonist, Victoria English May 2011 Glacier Media        349,784           58,297 
Gazette, Montreal English May 2011 Brunswick News Inc. 99,696 16,616 
Red Deer Advocate English June. 2011 Brunswick News Inc. 170,412 28,402 
The Daily Gleaner, Fredericton English Nov. 2011 Brunswick News Inc. 161,100 26,850 
Times-Transcript, Moncton English Nov. 2011 Brunswick News Inc. 485,369 80,895 
New Brunswick Telegraph Journal English Nov. 2011 Black Press n/a n/a
% of Circ behind Paywall (2011) 4 4
Cranbrook Daily Townsman English Feb. 2012 Black Press          23,834             4,767 
Daily Bulletin English Feb. 2012 Black Press 15,215 3,043
Vancouver Sun English Aug. 2012 Postmedia Network Inc.        820,719         136,787 
The Province, Vancouver English Aug. 2012 Postmedia Network Inc. 686,805 114,467
Ottawa Citizen* English Aug. 2012 Postmedia Network Inc.        550,777           91,796
Journal de Montréal French Sep. 2012 Quebecor/Sun Media     1,626,327         232,332
Journal de Québec French Sep. 2012 Quebecor/Sun Media 1,063,611 151,944
Globe and Mail English Oct. 2012 Globemedia Inc. 2,018,923 336,487
Ottawa Sun English Dec. 2012 Quebecor/Sun Media 238,584 34,083
Toronto Sun English Dec. 2012 Quebecor/Sun Media 849,131 121,304
Winnipeg Sun English Dec. 2012 Quebecor/Sun Media 328,303 46,900
Calgary Sun English Dec. 2012 Quebecor/Sun Media 302,938 43,277
Edmonton Sun English Dec. 2012 Quebecor/Sun Media 263,542 37,649
% of Circ behind Paywall (2012) 31 31
Medicine Hat English Apr. 2013 Glacier Media 73,938 12,323 
National Post English May 2013 Postmedia Network Inc. 1,116,647 186,108
Calgary Herald* English May 2013 Postmedia Network Inc. 641,495 106,916
Edmonton Journal* English May 2013 Postmedia Network Inc. 555,252 92,542
Windsor Star English May 2013 Postmedia Network Inc. 297,679 49,613
Guardian, Charlottetown English May 2013 TC Media 86,261 14,377
Leader-Post, Regina English May 2013 Postmedia Network Inc. 204,814 34,136
StarPhoenix, Saskatoon English May 2013 Postmedia Network Inc. 234,045 39,008
Lethbridge Herald English Jun. 2013 Glacier Media 115,941 16,563
Daily News, Truro English Jul. 2013 TC Media 26,820 4,470
Chronicle-Herald, Halifax English Aug. 2013 Halifax Herald Ltd. 548,938 91,490
The Journal-Pioneer, Summerside English Nov. 2013 TC Media 36,169 6,028
% of Circ behind Paywall (2013) 44.6 44.5
Western Star, Corner Brook English Jan. 2014 TC Media n/a n/a
Cape Breton Post, Sydney English Feb. 2014 TC Media        101,179           16,863
Trail Times English Mar, 2014 Black Press          11,200             2,800
Telegram, St. John’s English Apr. 2014 TC Media        171,054           28,509
Prince Albert Daily Herald English Jun. 2014 Star News          31,425             5,238
% of Circ behind Paywall (2014) 58.2 58
Nanaimo Daily English Sep. 2015 Black Press       43,185          7,197.5
% of Circ behind Paywall (2015) 58.3 58.1
Toroto Star English Sep. 2018 Torstar 2,162,443       308,920

